Privacy Power Europe - Protecting Others by Protecting Ourselves by Flaton, Reinder
Privacy Power Europe 
Protecting others by protecting ourselves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reinder Flaton 
0942251 
reinderflaton@gmail.com 
Leiden University 
July 2015 
Word count (excluding footnotes and references): 19991 
Total word count: 23930  
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
2 
 
0  Table of contents 
 
1  Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 4 
2  Normative Power Europe ........................................................................................................... 5 
2.1  The NPE hypothesis ............................................................................................................. 6 
2.2  Constructive criticism .......................................................................................................... 8 
2.2.1  Cosmopolitanism ........................................................................................................... 8 
2.2.2  Self-reflexivity ................................................................................................................ 9 
2.2.3  Market Power Europe ................................................................................................ 10 
2.3  NPE analytical method ...................................................................................................... 11 
2.4  Privacy Power Europe ........................................................................................................ 12 
2.4.1  Normative Intent ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.4.2  Normative Action......................................................................................................... 13 
2.4.3  Normative Impact ....................................................................................................... 14 
2.4.4  PPE ideal type features ............................................................................................. 15 
3  Big Data .......................................................................................................................................... 17 
3.1  The good news ..................................................................................................................... 18 
3.2  The bad news ....................................................................................................................... 20 
4  Normative Intent ......................................................................................................................... 24 
4.1  Data Protection Directive ................................................................................................. 25 
4.2  Reform..................................................................................................................................... 29 
4.3  General Data Protection Regulation ............................................................................ 30 
4.4  A global strategy ................................................................................................................. 32 
4.5  A higher goal ........................................................................................................................ 33 
5  The validity of the privacy norm ........................................................................................... 34 
5.1  The value of privacy .......................................................................................................... 34 
5.2  Privacy around the globe ................................................................................................. 37 
6  Normative Action ........................................................................................................................ 39 
6.1  Dialogue with third countries ......................................................................................... 39 
6.2  Dialogue with the United States ................................................................................... 43 
6.2.1  Passenger Name Records ........................................................................................ 43 
6.2.2  The SWIFT Affair ......................................................................................................... 44 
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
3 
 
6.2.3  Safe Harbor ................................................................................................................... 48 
6.2.4  N.S.A. .............................................................................................................................. 50 
6.3  Court rulings ......................................................................................................................... 54 
6.3.1  Data Retention Directive .......................................................................................... 56 
6.3.2  The Right to be Forgotten........................................................................................ 59 
7  Normative Impact ....................................................................................................................... 64 
7.1  Impact on individual enterprises .................................................................................. 65 
7.2  Impact on third country legislation .............................................................................. 69 
8  Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 73 
9  References ..................................................................................................................................... 78 
 
  
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
4 
 
1  Introduction 
 
On January 25th 2012, a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was 
proposed as an extended reform of the currently applicable 1995 Data 
Protection Directive (DPD). A regulation rather than a directive, the reform 
will entail enhanced scope for uniform data protection standards as 
composed by the European Union (EU). Its application, however, is bounded 
by territorial limitations. EU regulation has direct effect only within the EU 
itself. Even so, EU regulation does affect third countries and foreign 
commercial enterprises. Data transfers are done on a global scale and are 
impervious to man-made geographical borders. Attempts to regulate them 
may therefore lead to jurisdictional overlaps. 
This paper focuses on the EU using its power to change standards abroad. 
This is done in light of the Normative Power Europe (NPE) concept. NPE is a 
particular perspective on the EU’s international role and its influence on 
affairs beyond its borders. From this perspective, the EU promotes and 
spreads its norms to third countries or other external entities. When it 
comes to privacy and data protection standards, the EU seems to be doing 
exactly this. In what follows it should become clear if this is accurate. The 
objective is to find out to what extent the EU is a normative power in the 
area of privacy and data protection.1   
                                                          
1
 I want to thank Jan Oster for helpful suggestions; Edward Snowden for giving me the inspiration to write about 
this topic; and Dennie Oude Nijhuis for convincing me to pursue this Master. I also thank my family, friends and of 
course my girlfriend simply for being alive. 
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2  Normative Power Europe 
 
The term Normative Power Europe (NPE) was first used by Ian Manners 
(2002) to distinguish the power the European Union wields on the 
international stage from that of other – more traditional – great powers of 
the past and present. Hence, the assumption is that the EU does things 
differently; differently than, say, the United States, which tends to use a 
more diverse package of powers, including its military strength. Military 
strength is something that the EU lacks, forcing it, or ‘enabling it’, to exert 
its influence in different ways. Of course, its component parts, the Member 
States, have various degrees of military capabilities, but, despite the 
existence of the CSDP, the EU does not have much control over them. What 
it does have control over, however, is its single market – the largest market 
in the world. The EU has the power to develop and enforce rules, which 
participants in the single market are obliged to comply with. This gives the 
EU a combination of economic power and political power over entities 
engaged in economic activities inside EU borders. So where its economic 
power derives from the size and importance of the single market, and its 
political power from its mandate to enforce agreed upon rules, one may 
argue that, in the area of foreign policy, there exists a power void left by the 
EU’s military non-power, which could be filled by a kind of normative power. 
The concept of NPE is one that conceptualizes the EU as an actor in 
international relations that has the power to influence others so as to 
persuade them to change their behavior. It is a way of saying to the rest of 
the world that ‘we’ believe in certain things, and that ‘they’ ought to believe 
in them too; that we do certain things on the basis of those beliefs, and that 
they should also be doing those things. It furthermore implies conceptions of 
the self as adherents to certain norms but also conceptions of others as 
entities who do not (yet) adhere to those norms. A normative power, then, 
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should have the ability to stimulate an evolutionary process in external 
actors that would guide them from point A to point B; from a point of non-
adherence to adherence. It should have the ability to make others act in 
ways they did not before. Others should thus either be persuaded by the 
universal validity of the norms propagated by the EU and for those reasons 
start acting in accordance with the norms, or – and this may just as well be 
– that even when particular others are not ready to accept as valid the 
norms themselves, the EU has other means of being persuasive when it 
comes to third parties being prepared to change their behavior.  
 
2.1  The NPE hypothesis 
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law.2 
Article 21 TEU above carries the spirit of the NPE hypothesis, and most likely 
formed the fundamental basis of Ian Manners’ (2002) original idea. The 
debates around the idea of EU normative power have been vivacious from 
the outset, casting doubt on some of the holy houses in International 
Relations scholarship. Manners, after all, positions himself opposite to 
adherents of the realist school in international relations (specifically Hedley 
Bull) when he discusses: “…the international role of the European Union (EU) 
as a promotor of norms which displace the state as the centre of concern.” 
                                                          
2
 Treaty on European Union, article 21 
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(Manners, 2002: 236) According to Hedley Bull, writing in the 1980s, ‘the 
civilian power of the EC was conditional upon the military power of states.’ 
Manners agrees that this was true for the 1980s, but counters that times 
have changed since then. The Cold War had fed many of the assumptions 
underlying the concepts of civilian and military power, but the collapse of the 
Soviet empire was neither caused by civil diplomacy nor by military force. 
Rather, Manners argues, it was caused by the power of ideas and norms.  
“I argue that by refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military 
power, it is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international 
identity/role as representing normative power.” (Manners, 2002: 238) 
Manners then elaborates further on the NPE concept by discussing the EU’s 
normative difference, the EU’s normative basis, and the diffusion of EU 
norms. The EU’s normative difference derives according to Manners from ‘its 
historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution.’ These 
characteristics are what makes the EU different. 
“…in my formulation the central component of normative power Europe is 
that it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this 
particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way.” (Manners, 
2002: 242) 
The EU’s normative basis derives from five ‘core norms’ which are implicitly 
or explicitly represented in the EU’s laws and policies, namely: peace, 
liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. These core norms are 
then promoted and spread through a process Manners calls ‘norm diffusion’. 
The six ways in which the norms are supposedly diffused are: contagion, 
informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, 
and cultural filter. Contagion has to do with leading by example – so 
essentially to be the change one wishes to see in the world. Informational 
diffusion is about strategically composed communications and proclamations 
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of intent. Procedural diffusion takes place when relationships with third 
parties are institutionalized through negotiations and agreements, bilateral 
or multilateral, and through EU enlargement.3 Transference refers to a 
process by which EU norms and standards are either exported or stimulated 
by means of the carrots and sticks principle.4 Overt diffusion occurs due to 
the EU being physically present in a third country. And finally, cultural filter 
describes the impact of international norms on learning processes in third 
countries.  
Thus, by grace of its structure, its principles, and its means for spreading its 
norms, the EU could be conceptualized as a normative power. 
 
2.2  Constructive criticism 
 
There are several legitimate criticisms of this first attempt by Manners 
(2002) to distinguish normative power from other sources of power. Diez 
(2005) and Sjursen (2006) both recognized that the concept of normativity 
is burdened by the presupposition that the EU is a force for good. The notion 
of ‘spreading norms’ has a somewhat pretentious tone to it. Different 
peoples have different norms so it really depends on the validity of the norm 
itself whether spreading that norm is something to be desired.  
 
2.2.1  Cosmopolitanism 
 
Helene Sjursen (2006) emphasized the need to develop criteria that would 
allow us to evaluate the validity of the norms the EU attempts to spread. 
                                                          
3 One of the requirements for a candidate country to become an EU member is to accept the Acquis 
Communautaire in full. This is a clear example of procedural diffusion as defined by Ian Manners 
(2002). After all, intergovernmental negotiations take place which should result in the third country 
adopting EU norms.  
4 A rewarding of ‘good’ behavior, and punishment of ‘bad’ behavior. 
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The goal of developing such criteria would be to identify universal norms, in 
relation to which one may judge the EU’s imagined normative activities. 
Sjursen proposes a kind of cosmopolitanism as a legitimate basis for EU 
normative acts. 
“…I have proposed that a focus on strengthening the cosmopolitan 
dimension to international law would be a strong indicator for a ‘normative’ 
or ‘civilizing’ power. - …a normative power would be one that seeks to 
overcome power politics through a strengthening of not only international 
but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals and not only the 
rights of states to sovereign equality. It would be a power that is willing to 
bind itself, and not only others, to common rules.” (Sjursen, 2006: 249) 
 
2.2.2  Self-reflexivity 
 
Thomas Diez (2005) also suggested a greater degree of self-reflexivity to 
guide EU external action. Diez explains how “…the narrative of ‘normative 
power Europe’ constructs the EU’s identity as well as the identity of the EU’s 
others in ways which allow EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings 
unless a degree of self-reflexivity is inserted.” Diez uses the condition of 
self-reflexivity as cure to an unscrutinized belief in one's own ‘goodness’. 
One's own norms are then deemed superior and for that reason deserve to 
be spread through whatever means, be they normative or forceful. Diez 
points to the Unites States as an example of a state using forceful means to 
project its norms. Diez warns against the EU going down this same path. If 
the EU noticeably aspires more military capabilities and ignores taking a 
reflexive stance towards itself, this could well be detrimental to its normative 
credibility. Thus, good intentions are insufficient. Actions should be 
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normatively congruent as well. ‘Hell is full of good meanings, but heaven is 
full of good works’; so goes the saying, and it applies here too.5  
 
2.2.3  Market Power Europe 
 
Chad Damro (2012) found that the EU is perhaps more accurately described 
as a Market Power (MPE). He highlights the importance of the single market, 
describing it as the EU’s ‘core’. According to Damro, the EU’s identity may 
have particular normative characteristics, but it is fundamentally a large 
market. This market is regulated by the EU, and thus any act which has an 
influence on external actors implicates the power of the market. The EU has 
exclusive competence over market-related regulatory policies, and the size 
and strength of the European market may result in the externalization of 
these policies.6  
One may categorize the externalization of EU regulatory policies under 
‘normative impact’. However, such impact is not necessarily a consequence 
of normative intentions. Damro focuses mainly on intentional 
externalization, but he recognizes that in some cases externalization may 
result unintentionally7. If the intent is (in part) to externalize internal policies 
and regulations, and these are constructed in light of a particular norm, then 
the degree to which they are in fact externalized can be measured to 
indicate the EU’s normative power. EU acts aimed at externalization may 
include external dialogues and negotiations, but also threats of suspension 
of bilateral agreements or delaying those being negotiated in the present. 
                                                          
5
 I vow to keep my use of such clichés to a necessary minimum. 
6
 Damro defines externalization as follows: The first stage of externalization occurs when the 
institutions and actors of the EU attempt to get other actors to adhere to a level of regulation similar 
to that in effect in the European single market or to behave in a way that generally satisfies or 
conforms to the EU’s market related policies and regulatory measures […] The second stage of 
externalization requires these non-EU targets actually to adhere to said level of regulation or to 
behave in said way. (Damro, 2012: 690)  
7
 See also Bradford (2011, 2012, and 2014) for the unintended externalization of EU norms. Chapter 7 
deals with this phenomenon. 
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These can be considered examples of intentional externalization.8 However, 
externalization may also occur unintentionally. Instead of the EU actively 
trying to spread a norm, the spread is then caused by virtue of the EU itself 
being important for third parties in various respects. As will be explained in 
chapter 7, the importance of single market access for commercial third 
parties may give it ‘involuntary incentives’ to adopt EU standards (Bradford, 
2014). 
 
2.3  NPE analytical method 
 
Tuomas Forsberg (2011) distinguished two approaches in studying 
normative power. The first is to announce the sense in which the term 
normative power is used prior to evaluation of a specific case, so that the 
scope of its use is clearly circumscribed. The second option is to say that 
normative power may be better described as an ideal-type. 
“Ideal types are thus idealized (but not necessarily normatively idealized) 
descriptions of the concrete features of things that help to compare 
otherwise fuzzy phenomena with each other. Ideal types are mental 
constructs, and in individual cases the features of an ideal type can be ‘more 
or less present’. Ideal types are therefore not true or false: they can only be 
described as being either helpful or unhelpful as heuristic aids for studying 
concrete phenomena.” (Forsberg, 2011: 1199) 
This paper takes the second approach. In approaching normative power as 
an ideal type, the objective is to define as properly as possible the features 
which would make the EU fit the ‘normative power’ label in the specified 
area. If the ideal type ‘normative power’ is assumed to have all the chosen 
features, it should be possible to answer the research question by analyzing 
                                                          
8 I elaborate on such normative action, based on different kinds of conditionality, in chapter 6. 
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to what extent the EU has these features as well. For each individual feature, 
the result might be different. This approach may be criticized in at least two 
ways. Either the wrong features are attributed to the imagined ideal type, or 
particular features are mistakenly attributed to the EU; or both. 
 
2.4  Privacy Power Europe 
 
The Privacy Power Europe (PPE) hypothesis is aimed at appraising the 
degree to which the EU is a normative power in the area of privacy and data 
protection. This area can, of the ‘five core norms’ mentioned earlier, be 
categorized under human rights. The PPE approach borrows in part from 
Manners’ (2008) ‘tripartite analysis’, which separates three analytical 
perspectives on normative power: intent (principles), action and impact.  
 
2.4.1  Normative Intent 
 
Manners (2008) referred to this first section of the tripartite analysis as the 
section dealing with ‘principles’. Manners (2008) included coherence and 
consistency as concepts through which to evaluate the principles of an NPE. 
These concepts narrowly correspond with the main points of criticism 
discussed in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2; those of Sjursen (2006) and Diez 
(2005). As such, cosmopolitanism and self-reflexivity are included 
repackaged and rephrased, perhaps slightly adjusted and arguably 
improved, as coherence and consistency.9  
                                                          
9
 “Coherence entails ensuring that the EU is not simply promoting its own norms, but that the 
normative principles that constitute it and its external actions are part of a more universalizable and 
holistic strategy for world peace.” (Manners, 2008: 56)  
“Consistency means ensuring that the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms which it does itself 
not comply with.” (idem) 
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This paper separates EU normative intent, dealing with the EU’s goals, 
norms, and how it aims to promote these; from the universal validity of the 
privacy norm. Evaluating the universal validity in chapter 5 in reference to 
the normative intent discussed in chapter 4, is meant to discern whether the 
EU is acting ‘coherently’. If the EU is promoting a norm of its own, which has 
no apparent support extending beyond EU borders – i.e., is not universally 
valid – then the value and desirability of promoting it can be considered 
questionable. If the norm promoted, on the other hand, transcends cultural 
differences and particular strategic and geopolitical interests, then EU 
attempts at promotion of such a norm can be categorized under normative 
action. 
The aim is to first develop an accurate picture of the EU’s motivations, 
predispositions and intentions with regard to privacy and the protection of 
personal data. This is done in the context of the importance of the privacy 
norm itself, especially in today’s world in which the existing importance of 
the internet and the increasing adoption of Big Data practices are, though 
beneficial in most respects, posing a threat to our ability to retain control 
over our personal data. The EU’s recognition of this fact will be considered, 
as will the acts it is pursuing or has pursued to deal with it.  
 
2.4.2  Normative Action 
 
In chapter 6, the EU’s actions are analyzed by looking at their engagements 
and dialogues with third countries and other external entities, and then 
especially the United States (US). The adequacy decisions made by the EU 
on the basis of article 25 of the Data Protection Directive (DPD), give it the 
means to ban data transfers to third countries due to those countries not 
providing adequate protection of the personal data of EU citizens when 
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transferred to said countries. The question then is whether this constitutes 
acting on the basis of normative intent, and whether the means used to 
persuade third countries to change policy are ‘normative means’ underlined 
by normative power, rather than particular other means underlined by other 
forms of power. 
The ongoing dialogues and negotiations with the US on the topic of data 
protection, mainly in the context of counter-terrorism, enjoy the most 
elaborate examination among things discussed in chapter 6. Interdependent 
allies for the most part, the EU and the US have engaged in heated debates 
in this area throughout recent years. In this case, the question is whether 
the EU takes a normative position in these debates; whether the EU shows 
internal consistency in the norms it propagates and the manner in which it 
acts; how the EU’s position has developed over the years; and how effective 
it is in its attempts at persuasion. 
Two ECJ rulings involving considerations of privacy and data protection are 
furthermore discussed. The ECJ is an institution with substantial power 
within the EU. Its decisions are binding and have seemingly aided the cause 
to promote privacy, internally and abroad. An assessment will be made to 
what extent the ECJ contributes to making the EU as a whole a normative 
power in the area of privacy and data protection. 
 
2.4.3  Normative Impact 
 
In chapter 7, the impact of EU action will be weighed by looking at the EU’s 
persuasiveness in their dialogues with third parties, the incentives such third 
parties have to change their behavior, and the extent to which the EU is 
actually able to externalize its norms. In the area of privacy and data 
protection, it thus pays to find out whether the EU’s data protection 
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regulations are in fact being externalized, and if the EU intentionally acts in 
pursuit of this goal; or if externalization is an unintended or secondary side-
effect.  
The externalization of norms may be caused by a variety of factors. When 
the EU acts intentionally to promote privacy, the means used to achieve 
normative impact should be indicative of the kind of power involved, 
normative or otherwise. When EU acts have the unintended consequence of 
achieving normative impact, the incentives of third parties to change policy 
should also be indicative of the kind of power involved. The impact of EU 
privacy and data protection norms on individual commercial enterprises will 
be considered, as well as the impact on third country legislation. The extent 
to which the EU is, or could potentially be, able to achieve normative impact 
in this area, should show how effective the EU is as a supposed normative 
power. Effectiveness should be considered an essential feature of the ideal 
type PPE. After all, an impotent power is no power at all. 
 
2.4.4  PPE ideal type features 
The features attributable to the Privacy Power Europe ideal type are the 
features which will be more or less present in the EU. These features are the 
following: 
1. PPE should have the intent to defend, promote and spread the privacy 
norm.10 
2. PPE should act in accordance with the privacy norm and should show 
internal consistency in doing so. 
                                                          
10
 The normative value of this feature is of course dependent on privacy being a universally valid norm. 
The PPE hypothesis is therefore partly dependent on presuming universal validity. Chapter 5 should 
legitimize this presumption. 
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3. PPE should elevate concerns about privacy and data protection over 
strategic concerns. 
4. PPE should be effective in achieving the spread of privacy and data 
protection norms. 
 
This study will proceed as follows. The next chapter discusses the increasing 
importance and relevance of Big Data and related digital developments. 
Benefits as well as risks will be recognized. Chapter 4 deals with the EU’s 
principles and intentions with regard to privacy and the protection of 
personal data in assessing the presence of normative intent. Chapter 5 is 
meant to establish the validity of the privacy norm and with it the 
cosmopolitan coherence of the EU acting in promotion of this norm. Chapter 
6 evaluates an array of EU actions, engagements, dialogues and decisions 
based on considerations of privacy and the desire to protect personal data. 
Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the normative impact the EU is able to 
achieve, and should show how effective the EU actually is or could 
potentially be in spreading its privacy and data protection norms. Chapter 8, 
finally, will conclude with a revaluation of the abovementioned PPE ideal type 
features, in order to answer to what extent the EU is a normative power in 
the area of privacy and data protection.  
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3  Big Data 
 
“There were five exabytes of information created by the entire world 
between the dawn of civilization and 2003, and now that same amount is 
created every two days.”11 
Big Data could be defined, quite simply, as ‘a lot of data’.12 Of course, such a 
definition does not come close to explaining what all the fuss is about. This 
chapter is intended to ensure a baseline understanding of big data and other 
contemporary data-related phenomena, as well as to sketch the essential 
context for the rest of the paper. Developments in big data in recent 
decades have been an important factor driving the European Union to draft 
and negotiate updated data protection legislation. It makes sense, therefore, 
to start with a brief discussion of those developments before moving on to 
EU actions in this area and to the supposed intentions underlying those 
actions.  
Many are excited about big data’s potential. Others are worried about its 
risks. The EU recognizes both sides, and in abstract terms it intends to 
capitalize on its potential and to mitigate its risks. As such, in the developing 
world of big data, there is good news and there is bad news. I will start with 
the good news. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Quote by Eric Schmidt (Google CEO) at the Techonomy Conference 2010, Lake Tahoe; the numbers 
he uses are of course contestable, but the point is that people produce and store much more 
information now than we used to. 
12 Data is defined by Merriam-Webster as factual information (as measurements or statistics) used as 
a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation. On many occasion, the terms ‘data’ and ‘information’ 
are virtually synonymous. 
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3.1  The good news 
 
“Big Data can't tap into our unconscious thought processes directly, of 
course. But with a vast storehouse of our past decisions to analyze, it could 
detect patterns of behavior we are not aware of, and those patterns could 
reveal the unconscious thought processes that drive the behavior. In a very 
real sense, Big Data could know us better than we know ourselves.”13  
There is much to be excited about when it comes to big data. First, however, 
one requires a sufficient grasp on the basic concept. Its inner workings are 
immensely complex, but it is not impossible to visualize big data’s primary 
features, and to construct a reasonably accurate picture of the overall 
concept. Some have described its development as moving toward the 
construction of a ‘global nervous system’. However interesting, this is a few 
steps beyond the scope of this paper. 
The amount of data that is generated these days is vast.14 In the current 
digital age, we are able to generate, store, spread, measure, and utilize 
massive amounts of information. We need physical sites to store this data, 
but the amount of space we need to store some amount of data is ever 
decreasing. For example, even though we still use localized data storage 
devices to store some amount of data, the advent and commercial success 
of cloud computing has made remote storage of – and remote access to – 
data an everyday phenomenon. Providers of cloud computing solutions make 
use of economies of scale with regard to data storage, and data storage 
                                                          
13 Quote by Dan Gardner: Smolan (2013: 15), an insight which could also be considered a negative. 
14 The collection of data is important for various kinds of learning. A scientist or an entrepreneur, data 
can help one achieve one’s ends. In either profession, one conducts a variety of experiments in order 
to find answers to lingering questions. Such experiments may give us valuable insights, allowing us to 
increase our shared knowledge and to optimize existing processes. Without the ability to gather and 
store data over time, as well as the ability to conduct proper and logically coherent analyses of said 
data, we would have to put all our trust in our imperfect senses and in fallible anecdotal evidence. Of 
course, the scientific method is no novelty. However, the amount of data available for analysis is. 
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centers are located all over the world.15 As such, they contribute to cost 
savings throughout the world economy.  
Thus, a growing amount of data is generated every day and we have 
increasing means to store this data. However, the more data is generated 
and stored, the more data there is to be analyzed. This is often a rather 
daunting task. Even CERN is unable to analyze all the data the Large Hadron 
Collider generates, and for this reason distributes it to its partners where 
necessary.16 Analyzing big data remains difficult, but the incentives to make 
it work are clearly there. The scientists at CERN recognize this, but 
commercial enterprises are also making increasing use of big data analysis 
to optimize their management (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012) or to 
develop new ways of catering to the consumer.  
Big data is already being used to make possible the provision of certain 
services, at least some of which many of us have already encountered 
before. Many businesses with a large customer base are collecting data 
about their customers and their behavior. This might be done offline by 
means of customer cards registering the purchases of returning customers, 
or online by means of customer accounts and digital tools registering page 
views, search commands, purchases, and all sorts of other actions. There is 
an array of software products available to help one analyze the collected 
data. Such analysis should allow the data collector to make predictions about 
the individual preferences of customers. In this way Amazon may suggest 
products to you, YouTube may suggest videos, Facebook may suggest 
friends, and the suggestions will often be on point. 
                                                          
15
 See for example Huawei’s  cloud storage services: a Chinese cloud computing operator storing the 
data of CERN, one of Europe’s most valuable assets <http://www.huawei.com/ilink/en/success-
story/HW_194986> 
16 CERN: What to Record? The volume of data produced at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) presents a 
considerable processing challenge. <http://home.web.cern.ch/about/computing/processing-what-
record> 
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Knowing what the customer wants allows a supplier to more accurately 
assess demand and thus to avoid overproduction and waste by managing a 
more optimized stock. It enables the producer to engage in more data-based 
decision-making (PWC, 2013).17 Big data also promises to grant, as far as it 
does not already, enormous benefits for health care provision. The European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), for example, gathers and 
analyzes data with the aim of preventing the spread of infectious diseases, 
while the digitization of medical records will allow health care providers to 
analyze the data to provide more efficient and targeted care (Groves, 2013). 
Furthermore, big data may help enhance energy efficiency through smart 
meters; it may help improve sport performance through personal 
quantification tools; it may ease the process of getting from one place to 
another in the fastest or most efficient manner through navigational tools; it 
may help financial traders to gain lucrative insights into markets; it may 
help identify climatic trends; it may even help security and law enforcement 
agencies to catch criminals or detect potential sources of danger. 
In short, big data may give us much. But what might it take from us? 
 
3.2  The bad news 
 
Data, especially in bulk, has become an incredibly valuable asset. And as is 
true for anything of value; the possibility exists that people with malicious 
intent aim to get their hands on it. If data can be a means to beneficial ends, 
it can also be a means to harmful ends. In general, if one is to prevent a 
valuable asset from falling into the hands of the wrong people, it ought to be 
protected. The required level of protection will in turn be dependent on the 
determined value of the asset.  
                                                          
17
 Which is preferable to conventional decision-making in the same way that an educated guess is 
preferable to a wild guess. 
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While there are a substantial number of data types which could be beneficial 
for specific purposes, there is one particular kind of data which poses the 
most clearly identifiable risk of abuse: personal data. Personal data, or 
personally identifiable information (PII), as it is often referred to in legal 
terms, is particularly sensitive because it concerns people’s ‘personhood’. It 
is information linked to the individual itself. Any abuse of such information 
has an immediate effect on a person; a sentient individual, capable of 
experiencing abuse first-hand. While information about material objects may 
well be abused for the selfish purposes of the abuser, it does not compare – 
as personally perceived consequences are concerned – to abuse of 
information about people. There exists a clear difference between kinds of 
data. They are not all the same.  
Big data, as previously explained, involves the storage and subsequent 
analysis of a lot of data. Such data may thus include data of the most 
sensitive kind: PII, which might for example refer to information contained 
in medical records. So when one imagines the benefits of medical records 
being digitized and analyzed with the aim of enhancing medical knowledge 
and thus of improving the quality of health services, one has not yet 
considered the fact that medical records are actually private information. It 
is not enough to say that the purposes of analysis are benign. Anyone can 
make such claim.  
Because private information tends to be sensitive, this information is often 
protected in one way or another. It is not accessible to everyone. Access has 
to be provided by those who own the information. Thus, accessibility is 
based on consent. Because big data involves big amounts of data, the 
process of acquiring consent from all the data owners is burdensome. And 
even if consent is acquired for accessing all or most of the data for some 
particular purpose, the data ought to be handled in such a way that access is 
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
22 
 
not inadvertently acquired by unauthorized persons. This is often no easy 
task, but it is certainly costly. 
Protection of valuable data indeed comes at a cost. It may also be deemed a 
distraction from the purpose for which access to the data was acquired in 
the first place. As such, the incentives do not always balance towards 
ensuring optimal protection. This puts sensitive PII at a risk, especially when 
analyzed in bulk. Even more so because the incentives for gaining access to 
the data might be quite substantial. Intervention by authorities to alter the 
balance of incentives can be argued to be justified in that case.  
When it comes to medical records; those often already enjoy reasonable 
protection, as ensured by the law. However, consider the amount of PII that 
is being collected and stored without us necessarily even being aware of it. 
Countless devices are brought to market that are connected to the internet 
and are collecting data about us. Such is the advent of the Internet of Things 
(IoT). The ‘things’ in IoT are often equipped with Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID)-tags which make it possible to identify and track the 
items within a data communication architecture designed for some purpose 
(Weber, 2010: 23). Tracking items entails collecting data about them. Users 
of such items do not necessarily know that the items are equipped with the 
tags as there need not be any visual or audible signal alerting the user of 
data communication taking place (Weber, 2010: 24; COM, 2014). Therefore, 
PII might end up stored on some remote storage device without the owner 
of the information knowing about it. 
Data may be collected for both benign and malicious purposes. However, 
even data collected for benign purposes may be ill-protected and vulnerable 
for unauthorized access. The more data is being collected by RFID-tagged 
items and the more commonplace such data collection becomes, the more 
data is floating around which is at risk of being abused if we pay no attention 
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to it. Without sufficient protection, PII may easily end up with the wrong 
people and in the wrong places. And even if the data is sufficiently 
protected, it could be used for purposes not intended. The fact that data is 
collected so covertly, makes it difficult for us to keep track of what happens 
with it, and to decide if we agree with it. 
Furthermore, the entities that may access our private information without 
authorization are not always your regular computer-savvy underground 
criminals. Our PII is also probably, and perhaps even especially, at risk of 
being illegitimately accessed by established corporate entities and 
government agencies; or a combination of both. The revelations of Edward 
Snowden have brought attention to the global data collection architecture 
built and operated by the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) and 
its partners, the proportions of which are almost beyond belief. The NSA is 
indiscriminately collecting and storing virtually all the communications taking 
place on the global internet (Greenwald, 2014; Harding, 2014). They 
certainly did not ask for permission. 
The data collection activities of the NSA are a perfect example of an entity 
claiming to have benign intentions, but where the implications of the 
collection are so severe as to make their supposed intentions meaningless. 
Even though the NSA is not yet capable of processing and analyzing all the 
data it collects; there are technological innovations likely on their way that 
might in the future make it possible for them to do so. The quantum 
computer might be such an innovation. Once that happens, the risks and 
consequences, though still unknown, are unsettling. Our PII, which is 
becoming more and more accessible through the internet, will almost 
undoubtedly end up in the hands of the NSA or other such agencies. That is, 
unless we do something about it. 
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4  Normative Intent 
 
In describing the intentions of the EU underlying its actions in the area of 
privacy and data protection, this chapter analyzes several EU 
communications and documents, aiming to find what appear to be 
proclamations of intent. This seems the only way in which one can ever hope 
to discover the intentions behind the actions of an institutional construct like 
the EU. The passages and proclamations are divided into three separate 
categories: 
1. Aimed at attaining economic and/or strategic gain for the EU and its 
citizens 
2. Aimed at attaining increased privacy and data protection for EU 
citizens 
3. Aimed at attaining increased privacy and data protection for people in 
general 
 
The intentions are ordered from self-interested to more cosmopolitan – or 
from strategic to normative. Various passages in EU communications and 
documents are discusses and evaluated, labeling them as belonging to one 
(or more) of the three categories. It will likely show that each category has 
its role, though some may hold more weight. The aim is to find whether 
category 3 holds enough weight for EU intent in the area of privacy and data 
protection to be qualified as ‘normative intent’. For this purpose, one may 
ask: does the EU have normative intentions in the area of privacy and data 
protection? This question can be either negated or confirmed by the 
evidence. 
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4.1  Data Protection Directive 
 
The 1995 Data Protection Directive18 was in part built upon 
recommendations made by the OECD in 198019, and the European Council’s 
1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data20.  
The OECD recognized: …that, although national laws and policies may differ, 
Member countries have a common interest in protecting privacy and 
individual liberties, and in reconciling fundamental but competing values 
such as privacy and the free flow of information. (OECD, 1980) 
The Council recognized, per article 1, covering the object and purpose of the 
convention, that: The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory 
of each Party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, 
respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right 
to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to 
him (“data protection”). (European Council, 1981) 
Article 1.1 of the Directive, covering the object, reads: …Member States shall 
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal 
data. (COM, 1995) 
These three documents are different in the forcefulness of the language 
used. This is, of course, largely due to the nature of the separate documents 
and the regulatory power of the institutions authoring them. Still, each 
passage can be placed under category 3. For the OECD passage, this is not 
surprising. After all, the OECD is not merely composed of EU Member States. 
However, none of the passages seem to discriminate between individuals 
                                                          
18 …of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 24 October 1995, on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
19 Guidelines covering the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data. 
20 Directive 95/46/EC, article 11 refers to the convention. 
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that are EU citizens and those that are not. The passage of the convention 
even explicitly states that nationality and residence are of no concern. On 
the other hand, it does also mention territorial boundaries. It can be argued, 
however, that this merely gives respect to the practical limitation of bounded 
jurisdiction, rather than a lack of cosmopolitan intent. 
The OECD guidelines also mention economic motivations for the 
harmonization of data privacy laws, but the OECD does not aspire economic 
gain for Europe only. It emphasizes potential gains for all its members, so it 
cannot belong to category 1. Yet because digital data flows are a global 
phenomenon, the EU might use the same arguments as the OECD does for 
harmonizing data privacy laws. Indeed, a Directive in general is aimed at 
harmonization. While it is true that a Directive is only meant to provide strict 
guidelines for action on the part of Member States, a Directive does also 
entail an obligation for Member States to implement measures required for 
the attainment of the stated purpose of the Directive. As such, the general 
intent of a directive is to get all Member States to take action in some area. 
The specific intent of Directive 95/46/EC was to get Member States to take 
action in the area of data protection. To an extent, this has happened. 
However, because individual Member States had an amount of freedom with 
regard to implementation, EU citizens in some countries remained less 
protected than EU citizens in other countries. This caused, and still causes, 
legal uncertainty for commercial enterprises operating in the EU market 
(Pearce and Platten, 1998). Enterprises doing business in multiple EU 
Member States had to comply with one set of regulations here and another 
set of regulations there. This raised the cost of compliance and thus 
increased incentives for noncompliance. Therefore, aside from the fact that it 
defeats the normative purpose of the Directive, such result is economically 
unsound. It is a barrier to trade, because it may defer enterprises from 
doing business in some countries or from allowing personal data processed 
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by them to flow freely from one Member State to another. According to 
provisions 7-9, the Directive was intended to provide remedy for this state of 
affairs, but it failed to do so in many respects. Such is the economic 
argument for reform and can thus be grouped under category 1.  
All three categories of intent are represented in various provisions and 
articles of the Directive, as can be seen in table 1. Some provisions belong 
to more than one category, while some are absent – for example because 
they deal with possible derogations. One may notice that a fair amount of 
the provisions are grouped under category 3, which would seem to confirm 
the presence of normative intent. It has to be said, however, that many of 
those provisions could also be placed under category 2, for the simple 
reason that an EU Directive is EU law and not a law governing all people. 
The division is done in this way because the provisions placed under 
category 2 specifically stated the territorial limitation, whereas the others did 
not. For example, provision 12 states that: Whereas the protection principles 
must apply to all processing of personal data by any person whose activities 
are governed by Community Law. In contrast, provision 2 states that: 
Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they 
must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons, respect their 
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, and 
contribute to economic and social progress, trade expansion and the well-
being of individuals. The latter clearly has wider scope than the former. 
While the provisions seem to balance towards category 3, article 3.2 adds 
substantial weight to category 2 when it states: This Directive shall not apply 
to the processing of personal data: - in the course of an activity which falls 
outside the scope of community law… The same is true for article 4.1a, and 
even though articles 4.1b and 4.1c describe situations in which territorial 
limitations are not so clear-cut, article 3.2 renders any further use of 
language hinting at cosmopolitan intent or general application essentially 
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meaningless, because the scope had already been narrowed down to EU 
territory. However, article 25.5 shows that the Commission may attempt to 
remedy a lack of protection in a third country. This appears to indicate an 
intention to attain increased privacy and data protection for the people in 
such third country, thus belonging to category 3. The intent could of course 
merely be to protect EU citizens’ data when crossing certain borders (cat. 2), 
thus increasing possibilities of trade (cat. 1), but then article 25.6 once 
again refers to the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and 
rights of individuals.  
TABLE 1 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
Provision number 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 43, 56 
1, 10, 12, 18, 
19, 63, 64 
2, 3, 10, 14, 18, 
20, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, 33, 38, 
39, 41, 45, 46, 
48, 51, 54, 55, 
56, 57, 59, 61, 
62, 63, 64, 65, 
68 
Article number 1.2 3.2, 4.1a,  4.1b, 4.2c, 25.5, 
25.6 
 
In case of Directive 95/46/EC, one may conclude that the territorial 
limitation inherent to a directive is indicative of EU intent being primarily of 
the second category, even though different intentional categories could 
coexist side by side. Provision 2 does suggest that the intent behind using 
the Directive as a means to an end, is fed by the conviction that privacy is a 
right which all people should enjoy. Therefore, while category 1 and 2 are 
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explicitly represented in the Directive, it can be argued that category 3 is 
implied in some of its phrasing.  
 
4.2  Reform 
 
Rapid technological developments and globalisation have brought new 
challenges for data protection. With social networking sites, cloud 
computing, location-based services and smart cards, we leave digital traces 
with every move we make. In this “brave new data world” we need a robust 
set of rules. The EU’s data protection reform will make sure our rules are 
future-proof and fit for the digital age. (COM, 2012a) 
Apart from the economic argument for reform mentioned earlier, another 
major argument has to do with the fact that the Directive is already twenty 
years old. And in this digital age, twenty years is a very long time. The world 
has changed a lot since 1995. As discussed in chapter 3, technology has 
changed and is changing in such a way as to pose significant risks to the 
privacy of individuals and their PII. A reform, therefore, essentially intends 
to achieve the same as the Directive was supposed to. The EU Factsheet 
‘Why do we need an EU data protection reform?’ (COM, 2012b) states that: 
Its basic principles, ensuring a functioning internal market and an effective 
protection of the fundamental right of individuals to data protection are as 
valid today as they were 17 years ago.  
As often seen in passages of the Directive, the above phrasing suggests that 
the EU considers data protection as ‘a fundamental right of individuals’. A 
right cannot in any way be ‘fundamental’ if it would apply only to EU 
citizens. Therefore, such phrasing gives the impression that the EU has 
category 3 intentions (in addition to category 1), yet simply has to work 
within its practical limitations. Indeed, the EU has since incorporated the 
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right to data protection into the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(Charter), under article 8. This gives credence to the notion that the EU has 
normative intentions in this area, regardless of the fact that the EU does not 
have limitless power to underline its intent. 
 
4.3  General Data Protection Regulation 
 
With data-based technologies increasingly infiltrating our lives, guidelines for 
instrumental action have to change. As such, a general data protection 
regulation (GDPR) was proposed in 2012.21 Because the proposed reform 
entails a transition from a Directive to a Regulation, guidelines will be 
replaced by law having direct effect in all Member States. This prevents 
differences in implementation and should ensure more legal clarity and equal 
protection under the law for all EU citizens. 
Because the GDPR, like the Directive, has limited territorial scope and has 
the same degree of category 1 intentions underlying it, the focus is on those 
passages which deal with international engagement; and the possible 
intention to attain increased privacy and data protection for people in 
general.  
Article 45, for example, deals with the intent and self-ascribed obligation to 
cooperate internationally to protect personal data. It states that the 
Commission should: develop effective international cooperation 
mechanisms…, provide mutual assistance…, engage relevant stakeholders…, 
and promote the exchange and documentation of legislation… in the 
enforcement of data protection legislation. This at the very least shows the 
intent to get third countries to adhere to a level of regulation similar to that 
in effect in the European single market – a process of attempted 
                                                          
21 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
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externalization (Damro, 2012: 690), thus stimulating an increase in data 
protection for people outside the EU (cat. 3). However, it may be argued 
that such intent merely derives from the aim to protect EU citizens’ PII 
abroad (cat. 2). Indeed, article 41.2a explains that the Commission, when 
evaluating the adequacy of protection in a third country, should consider, 
among other things: …effective and enforceable rights including effective 
administrative and judicial redress for data subjects, in particular for those 
data subjects residing in the Union whose personal data are being 
transferred. In this, the Commission seems to give priority to the protection 
of EU citizens, which albeit completely understandable, is perhaps not 
entirely cosmopolitan. 
International engagements with regard to data protection are based on clear 
category 1 intentions. As the Commission has extensive consultations with 
relevant private sector entities before drafting and adopting a law, the 
stakeholders involved have voiced their criticisms of barriers to international 
data transfers. Such barriers are likely to impede their international business 
operations. As such, the intent behind the Commission’s international 
engagement is at least in part based on economic considerations. (COM, 
2012a: p. 4) The Commission also predicts that companies from countries 
without data protection standards as high as those in the EU will be at a 
disadvantage compared to EU companies. Non-EU companies will have to 
comply with EU rules to gain access to the single market while EU-
companies will have a head start when foreign markets start adopting 
similar standards. (COM, 2012c: p. 3) 
The international elements of the GDPR are again a combination of category 
1 and 2 intentions, with some of the language hinting at underlying 
cosmopolitan convictions of the third category. The inclusion of article 8 in 
the Charter confirms this conviction.  
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4.4  A global strategy 
 
When the EU acts on the international stage, it intends to achieve something 
with its acts. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has published 
its strategy for 2015-2019. They call it ‘Leading by Example’ (EDPS, 2015). 
The title already reveals a potential for significant category 3 normative 
intentions. Its vision includes the forging of global partnerships.  
Its proposed actions are: 
 Developing an ethical dimension to data protection 
 Mainstreaming data protection into international agreements 
 Speaking with a single EU voice in the international arena (p.18-19)22 
 
The internet is fundamentally a global environment, and the EU needs to act 
with this in mind.23 The EU commissioner for the Digital Economy has 
already urged for the UN to create a data protection agency.24 The EDPS 
also recognizes the necessity of a global approach and proposes extensive 
international discussion and collaboration in working towards a common 
purpose: protecting privacy and personal data in a smart and efficient way.25 
Although the EDPS is an independent entity, it is certainly part of the EU and 
has explicit normative intentions. And with the EDPS being the EU’s 
appointed authority in the area of data protection, their intentions will 
presumably be consequential. 
                                                          
22 Underlined by COM (2012c: p. 84) - …to improve and streamline the current procedures for 
international data transfers, including legally binding instruments and ‘Binding Corporate Rules’ in 
order to ensure a more uniform and coherent EU approach vis-à-vis third countries and international 
organizations. 
23 Underlined by COM (2012c: 88) - …A global harmonized approach towards data protection is 
deemed indispensable especially bearing in mind the growing popularity of cloud computing. 
24 Warden, G., Treanor, J. (2015). UN needs agency for data protection, European commissioner tells 
Davos. The Guardian, 22-01-2015 
25 Underlined by COM (2012c: 87) - …enhance its cooperation, to this end, with third countries and 
international organizations, such as the OECD, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, and other 
regional organizations; - closely follow up the development of international technical standards by 
standardization organizations such as CEN and ISO… 
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4.5  A higher goal 
 
So in conclusion of this chapter, does category 3 hold enough weight for EU 
intent in the area of privacy and data protection to be qualified as ‘normative 
intent’? Although the Directive and the Regulation are laws which apply only 
to the EU, its market and its citizens; the language used in these documents 
as well as various related communications on occasion hint at a higher goal. 
The fact that data protection was included in the Charter as a fundamental 
right does indeed suggest that it is deemed applicable to all individuals, no 
matter their nationality, ethnicity or background. Indeed, the fact that 
political refugees, for example, may not be sent back to their country of 
origin if that will likely result in a violation of their human rights according to 
the Charter, is a clear indication that such human rights are based on shared 
convictions about ‘human beings’ and not merely about those residing in the 
EU. Article 21 of the TEU also states that protecting human rights is one of 
the principles that should guide the EU when acting internationally. It is fair 
to conclude, therefore, that the EU has normative intentions in the area of 
privacy and data protection.  
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5  The validity of the privacy norm 
 
To be a normative power in the area of privacy and data protection, the EU 
needs to be engaged in promoting the privacy norm. In fact, any supposed 
normative power should be engaged in promoting some kind of norm. 
Sjursen (2006) argued that such a norm should be subject to a degree of 
scrutiny. Indeed, if a particular norm were not universally valid, the value of 
being a normative power for said norm would be questionable. Manners 
(2008) called it the virtue of coherence. For the EU’s external actions in the 
area of privacy and data protection to be coherent, they ought to be part of 
a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace (Manners, 
2008:56). Perhaps in this specific case, it would be more accurate to speak 
of a strategy for the betterment of the human condition. 
This chapter tackles the question whether an increase in privacy and data 
protection betters the human condition. If the answer is yes, then the 
privacy norm can be considered universally valid and therefore worthy of 
promotion. The EU being a promotor of this norm, at least supposedly, 
would thus help to qualify it as a normative power in the area of privacy and 
data protection. If the answer is no, on the other hand, then promotion of 
the norm would be futile if not unethical, and it would legitimize asking the 
question why the EU is even engaged in attaining it for its own citizens. 
 
5.1  The value of privacy 
 
Privacy is indispensable to a wide range of human activities. If someone calls 
a suicide hotline or visits an abortion provider or frequents an online sex 
website or makes an appointment with a rehabilitation clinic or is treated for 
a disease, or if a whistle-blower calls a reporter, there are many reasons for 
keeping such acts private that have no connection to illegality or 
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wrongdoing. In sum, everyone has something to hide. Reporter Barton 
Gellman made the point this way: Privacy is relational. It depends on your 
audience. You don’t want your employer to know you’re job hunting. You 
don’t spill all about your love life to your mom, or your kids. You don’t tell 
trade secrets to your rivals. […] …Comprehensive transparency is a 
nightmare… Everyone has something to hide. (Greenwald, 2014: 181-182) 
Daniel Solove (2008) has shown that although many scholars agree on the 
virtue and importance of privacy, the concept of it is one that is ‘in disarray’. 
So while it is imperative to conceptualize privacy, it is and remains a very 
demanding task. And whereas the importance of privacy almost seems a 
matter of intuition, such intuitive argument for why privacy is indeed 
important and should be protected is not philosophically satisfactory 
(Negley, 1966). The world is changing regardless of how we feel about it, 
and our ideas about what it is or should be are not the same as in the past, 
and will presumably change in the future. There is no predicting, at least not 
with certainty, if future generations will value privacy to the same extent as 
we did or do now. Nevertheless, the conceptualization and valuation of 
privacy is an ongoing philosophical conversation with real world applications. 
According to Rachels (1975), the ability of individuals to control what others 
observe and know about them, allows them to maintain different kinds of 
relationships with different kinds of people. People act differently when they 
are alone than when around other people; act differently when alone with 
certain people rather than others; and differently again when in public or 
engaged in formal affairs. The content of conversations within these different 
kinds of relationships are thus dependent on the nature of the relationship. 
Some topics are deemed appropriate for conversation in some relationships 
but not in others. For that reason, people might stop talking about certain 
things when the conversation is being observed by one or more outsiders.  
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Rachels (1975) gives the example of two close friends having a private 
conversation about personal things the content of which is deemed ‘not the 
business’ of people not considered to be ‘close’ friends or even friends at all. 
The conversation may continue so long as it is assumed that others have no 
access to the content of the conversation. The moment at which an outsider 
‘joins’ the conversation, the personal topics discussed prior to the 
newcomer’s arrival may now be deemed inappropriate to discuss. Now 
imagine this situation – that of a third person being present in the 
conversation – to go on indefinitely; a situation in which the two friends 
might never again be able to truly converse in private. The relationship 
between the two is bound to change. Unless, of course, they are willing to 
discuss their personal affairs in the presence of the third person, always.26 
Above example can be extended to apply to a government surveillance 
apparatus being indefinitely present to indiscriminately observe everyone’s 
communications. Jeremy Bentham (1787) developed the idea of a 
Panopticon observing the prisoners day in day out. The prisoners would not 
know for sure that they were being watched, but the possibility was always 
there, which would make them wary of discussing things they did not want 
others, especially the prison wardens, to know about. The ability to have a 
sense of being alone then disappears, and with it the sense of being free. 
Now, in a prison, one is not free in the first place. However, when a 
‘Panopticon-like’ system is present on the internet, a medium on which 
nearly everyone on the planet has some kind of presence, it will affect those 
who have the right not to be affected. When Big Brother was on TV, one 
could choose to participate. There is no such choice involved with 
indiscriminate government surveillance.27 
                                                          
26
 It may be assumed, with the reader’s permission, that this is rarely the case. 
27 While espionage may be deemed appropriate in situations with proper cause, such proper cause is 
by definition not established when the espionage is done indiscriminately. 
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In response to the revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013, the question of 
why privacy is important has gained global traction. Although the right to 
privacy is not a particularly novel concept, the importance of protecting it in 
the digital age certainly seems to be. Such protection is no longer bound to 
the physical world and is not only necessary in defense of attempted 
violations by private persons and organizations, but also in defense of 
government intrusion. The NSA’s spying operations affect the entire globe. 
In a reactionary manner, “the world” seems to have fixated its attention on 
the protection of data, and especially of PII, against the NSA and similar 
entities, and against potential intrusions in general. One can be assured, 
therefore, that the EU is not the only entity engaged in the promotion of 
privacy and data protection. And when normative goals align, impact is 
much more likely.  
 
5.2  Privacy around the globe 
 
Privacy is an issue of profound importance around the world.28  
A wide array of international organizations – political ones as well as NGO’s 
– are actively aiming to promote privacy. On December 18th 2013, the 
United Nations adopted a resolution on ‘the right to privacy in the digital 
age’29, reaffirming ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (United 
Nations, 1948: art. 12) and ‘The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’ (United Nations, 1966: art. 17). The resolution called on all nations 
to adopt measures to protect privacy and personal data (art. 4). 
Furthermore, Privacy International, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2013), European Digital Rights, 
the Digital Rights Foundation, etc., with words or with actions, and alone or 
                                                          
28
 Solove, Daniel (2008: 2). Understanding Privacy. 
29 Resolution 68/167 
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together30, have all in recent years contributed to the promotion of privacy 
and data protection rights; while political regions such as the Asia-Pacific 
(APEC, 2005; Hogan Lovells, 2014), South-America (Bloomberg, 2013; 
Eustace and Bohn, 2013), South-Africa (Hogan Lovells, 2014b), and even 
the United States with its proposed USA Freedom Act and the Consumer Bill 
of Rights, are seemingly following up on the many words spoken about the 
subject. The conversation is a heated and continuous one, with already the 
37th International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners Conference 
being held in Amsterdam on October 26th of this year.  
It can be said with some certainty, therefore, that the EU is not just 
promoting its own norms. It is a global issue and a global conversation 
demanding global solutions. The privacy norm can therefore be regarded as 
universally valid, and promotion of it can for this reason be considered 
‘coherent’. However, to be a true normative power in the area of privacy and 
data protection, normative intentions are not enough. Many others are 
pushing the issue just as hard, if not harder. What the key thus seems to be, 
is to be more effective than others in pushing for adequate reform and 
stimulating positive change. And that’s where ‘power’ comes in. 
  
                                                          
30 Human Rights Watch (2015). Joint Statement from Article 19, Human Rights Watch, Privacy 
International, Digital Rights Foundation, and others on the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill 2015 
Pakistan. Human Rights Watch, 19-04-2015 
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6  Normative Action 
 
This chapter discusses acts by EU institutions on the basis of legal provisions 
involving privacy and data protection, as well as statements, negotiations 
and events wherein these values are at stake. This primarily includes 
engagements and dialogues with third countries and other external entities, 
which would constitute intentional attempts at externalization of EU norms. 
Furthermore, relevant court rulings by the European Court of Justice are also 
considered. 
 
6.1  Dialogue with third countries 
 
Directive 95/46/EC, article 25(6) of Chapter IV on the transfer of personal 
data to third countries reads: The Commission may find, in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 31 (2), that a third country ensures an 
adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this 
Article, by reason of its domestic law or of the international commitments it 
has entered into, particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations referred to 
in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms 
and rights of individuals. If the Commission (having taken into account the 
opinions of the Article 29 Working Party and the Article 31 Committee) does 
indeed find that a third country has adequate safeguards in place to prevent 
potential abuse of the personal data of EU citizens, it may make an official 
decision on that basis. Such an adequacy decision covers data transfers from 
all EU Member States, and including the members of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), to the third country to which the decision applies. Once the 
decision is made, data transfers from the EU/EEA to the third country may 
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take place freely and without additional safeguards. Various countries have 
so far been recognized.31 
According to Manners (2002), one ought to look at engagement and 
dialogue when evaluating the ethicality of the normative power involved in 
some act. As the composition of Directive 95/46/EC was necessarily prior to 
any negotiations with third countries about the adequacy of their protection, 
the Directive as a whole has been exerting a normative influence on EU 
internal entities for quite some time now. After all, law making is an 
inherently normative activity. However, the normative influence on EU 
internal entities is not what the NPE hypothesis attempts to explain. The NPE 
hypothesis is about deliberate attempts to exert normative influence on EU 
external entities, or at least about normative acts the scope of which 
reaches beyond the borders of the EU’s Member States. Therefore, the most 
relevant acts regarding adequacy decisions are the negotiations with third 
countries, referred to in article 25(5). This is the kind of dialogue one would 
expect a supposed normative power to be engaged in.  
It is important to evaluate such dialogues and related activities in light of 
prior intent and posterior impact. The intent underlying any sort of 
negotiation is to come to an agreement. Such an agreement would in this 
case have to be in line with what the Commission deems to ensure adequate 
protection of the personal data of EU citizens. The intent of the agreement is 
thus to protect the personal data of EU citizens even when said data is 
transferred to areas over which the EU has no jurisdiction. It can be said, 
then, that the intent of the negotiations is simply to protect EU citizens. 
However, if the Commission negotiates with some third country, and this 
third country at the start of the negotiations is not yet able to ensure 
adequate protection, then the intent of the negotiations is also to trigger a 
                                                          
31
 Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Uruguay, and the Safe Harbour Principles applied to companies in the United States 
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process of change in the third country. Negotiations ought to guide the third 
country from data protection standards that are too low to the adoption of 
standards that are high enough. The intent underlying adequacy decisions is 
therefore the protection of EU citizens by triggering change in a third 
country.  
The value, or ‘appropriateness’, of the acts themselves – the adequacy 
decisions – is measured by the posterior impact being in line with what was 
intended. So if the impact of an adequacy decision includes a change in the 
third country and thus an enhancement of protection of EU citizens (of which 
the latter is difficult to measure, so more likely assumed), then the decision 
may be judged appropriate. An adequacy decision judged appropriate in this 
manner, however, will probably also have the effect of enhancing the 
protection of the inhabitants of the third country. And if it does indeed have 
this effect, then one may speak of ‘normative impact’, because the data 
protection norms will then have changed due to acts undertaken by an EU 
institution.  
To further assess the degree to which the EU is a normative power regarding 
data protection, one may look at the ethicality of the intent as being part of 
some cosmopolitan strategy – the extent to which it is ‘coherent’ (Sjursen, 
2006; Manners, 2008). When it comes to adequacy decisions, judging 
ethicality in this way is very much dependent on how one looks at the 
matter. As argued in chapter 5, the promotion of privacy and data protection 
standards may in itself be considered part of a universally fought fight for a 
fundamental right. On the other hand, the outspoken aim of the 
Commission’s negotiations and subsequent adequacy decisions: the 
protection of EU citizen’s personal data, can be considered a somewhat 
selfish one, with the resulting improvement of the conditions in the third 
country being a welcome but unintended consequence. This latter and 
slightly more skeptical conclusion is of course dependent on the Commission 
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actually having selfish motivations, while the reasoning might just as well 
be: ‘our citizens benefit, your citizens benefit, thus we all win’.  
Other things to look at are the incentives of the third country. The intent of 
the Commission itself might be one thing or another, but one ought not 
forget that the third country is the other half of the conversation. If the 
negotiations result in reforms of the data protection laws in the third 
country, then the law makers in the third country will somehow have been 
persuaded to do so. Even if one assumes that the prior intent as well as the 
posterior impact of the EC initiating negotiations were to externalize EU 
norms, the validity of the norms themselves will not necessarily have been 
what persuaded the third country to change.  
According to the Commission (2012c: 39), the Commission’s adequacy 
decisions are perceived by some third countries as a means to promote their 
strategy for a digital economy and a modern information society. These 
countries consider that adequacy decisions will allow them to become 
actively involved in international flows of personal data and they will thus 
become internationally recognized as offering adequate infrastructure and 
adequate means for processing personal data received from the rest of the 
world. The Commission’s adequacy decisions would then serve as a kind of 
certification. If accurate, however, such incentive for third countries would 
be best described as strategic, not normative.  
The intent of both sides of the dialogue is relevant in determining what kind 
of power is actually involved in the achievement of normative impact. So 
while the EU’s intentions may be one or the other, if the opposite side – the 
impacted party – has strategic intentions, this may reveal much more about 
the kind of power involved than anything else.32 
                                                          
32
 Incentives of commercial third parties are also discussed in chapter 7. 
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6.2  Dialogue with the United States 
 
The dialogues between the EU and the US on the topic of data protection are 
a long winding and continuing story, and shed a revealing light on the EU’s 
normative intent and (lack of) internal consistency. Data protection has been 
discussed and negotiated mostly in the context of counter-terrorism. The 
relevant Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) prerogatives of the EU are mostly the competency areas of the 
Council and the Commission. However, it is the European Parliament that 
has always been the most vocal proponent of enhanced data protection and 
privacy during negotiations with the US. But despite its intentions and 
ambitions, the EP often lacked the power to influence the negotiations such 
that privacy and data protection concerns were addressed to its satisfaction.  
 
6.2.1  Passenger Name Records33 
 
The agreements with the US with regard to Passenger Name Records (PNR), 
for example – records which were to be handed over to US immigration 
services and intelligence agencies at their command – were not well-
received and heavily criticized by the EP and the Article 29 Working Party.34 
However, because the EP lacked any real power in this area – its obligatory 
involvement under the Consultation Procedure not stretching any further 
than being allowed to give its opinion – the PNR agreement was established 
                                                          
33
 An EU-based PNR system has recently been approved by the EP, as well as the mandate to start negotiations 
with the Council: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150714IPR81601/html/Passenger-Name-Records-MEPs-back-EU-system-with-data-protection-
safeguards> 
34
 The Commission ‘caved’ in to US demands on PNR: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/feb/11usdata.htm>  
while the EP adopted a critical resolution on it: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/mar/uspass91564en.pdf> 
as well as Article 29 Working Party: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp87_en.pdf> 
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anyway.35 Heavy criticism remained with subsequent revised PNR 
agreements because the EP’s concerns were not sufficiently addressed; 
much to the resentment of various MEP’s. As such, the EP’s vocal defense of 
privacy and data protection became at the same time an institutional 
struggle for power (Pawlak, 2009; Ripoli Servent & Mackenzie, 2011; De 
Goede, 2012; Romaniello, 2013).  
 
6.2.2  The SWIFT Affair 
 
This struggle continued in the dialogues surrounding the SWIFT affair. 
SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is 
an important globally operating enterprise facilitating international bank 
transfers. Hence, they deal with the exchange of financial data, which 
includes the PII of many European citizens. SWIFT’s headquarters are in 
Belgium, and it used to also have a branch in Virginia. 
After, and in response to, the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the 
US government developed and set-up the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program (TFTP). In secret. In the context of this program, SWIFT was to be 
involved in investigations on many occasion. Such involvement entailed 
demands for financial data of EU citizens. Therefore, the Data Protection 
Directive applied. Having branches both in Belgium and in Virginia, however, 
SWIFT was bound by two vastly different jurisdictions when it comes to the 
protection of personal data. Hence, SWIFT was caught in a kind of Catch-22: 
                                                          
35
 See Commission decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the 
Passenger Name Record of air passengers to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C(2004) 
1914: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004D0535&from=EN>   
See also Council decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community 
and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004/496/EC: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004D0496&from=EN>  
It eventually resulted in an agreement with the US on 28 May 2004 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/adequacy/pnr/2004-05-28-agreement_en.pdf> 
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
45 
 
obeying US government demands would imply violating EU and Belgian law, 
while noncompliance with the US would be illegal from an American 
perspective.  
When the TFTP program was revealed by the American press36, the EP 
reacted vigilantly.37 Of course, the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS 
also strongly condemned the affair.38 After a new temporary EU-US 
compromise due to the concerns raised, SWIFT announced their plans for a 
‘system re-architecture’.39 This restructuring ensured that SWIFT would have 
its data stored solely in Europe. The United States thus no longer had the 
legal power to force SWIFT to hand over data, which created a major 
incentive for the US to renegotiate an agreement. The EP was kept in the 
dark about these negotiations; and when the EP found out, MEP Sophie in ‘t 
Veld (LIBE) requested access to the relevant documents. Yet EP demands 
were basically ignored and the interim agreement was signed without the 
EP’s involvement exactly one day before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force (De Goede, 2012; Romaniello, 2013). Art. 218 of the revised Lisbon 
TFEU would have required the EP to consent to such international 
agreements. The agreement was signed before this rule could be called upon 
(Ripoli Servent & Mackenzie, 2011). 
                                                          
36
 See Lichtblau, Eric & Risen, James (2006, June 23). Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror. The New 
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> and 
Simpson, Glenn R. (2006, June 23). Treasury Tracks Financial Data In Secret Program. The Wall Street Journal 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115101988281688182>  
37
 Public Hearing of the EP on the interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT system by the US secret 
services: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20061004/libe/programme_en.pdf> 
38
 Press Release on the SWIFT Case following the adoption of the Article 29 Working Party opinion on the 
processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT): 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/news/docs/PR_Swift_Affair_23_11_06_en.pdf> and the Opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor – Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of  Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program (TFTP II) 
<https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2010/10-06-
22_Opinion_TFTP_EN.pdf> 
39
 SWIFT (2007, June 15). SWIFT announces plans for system re-architecture. 
<http://www.swift.com/about_swift/legal/swift_announces_plans_for_system_re_architect> 
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It is fair to say that the EP was treated rather badly here, and this treatment 
would indeed have its consequences. The first new SWIFT agreement was 
rejected by the EP, despite substantial lobbying efforts by United States 
officials (Monar, 2010; Ripoli Servent & Mackenzie, 2011; Romaniello, 
2013). From that moment it was clear that the EP’s concerns needed to be 
seriously addressed if an agreement was ever going to be reached. When 
new negotiations for a long-term agreement were called upon, it gave the EP 
the opportunity to use its newly gained power to influence the outcome of 
the negotiations. They had to approve of agreements made, and because of 
this, intensive cooperation was needed from the initial stages of negotiation 
(Cremona, 2011). After all, the agreement needed to be drafted in a way 
that would have the EP likely approve it (Romaniello, 2013).  
The EP always seemed more concerned about data protection than the 
Commission and the Council. The EP’s normative intent in the area of 
privacy and data protection can thus be considered higher. As an 
institutional component, the EP is perhaps the best example of a normative 
power within the EU as a whole. It is a normative power which used to lack 
the instruments to have its intentions and positions translate into actual 
impact. They simply lacked the necessary power. However, this changed 
when the Lisbon Treaty took effect. The increased institutional power should 
then have allowed the EP to have its intent translate into more impact.  
The SWIFT case shows the EU internal inconsistencies on privacy and data 
protection. Hence, the shift in the institutional balance should have made the 
EU has a whole more of a normative power in the area of data protection 
than it was before. The normative intent in the area of data protection was 
always present in the EU, but the power underlying the intent was less 
present before the Lisbon Treaty than it was after. The increase in the 
underlying power has made the potential for impact higher. Its actions 
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should show whether the EP is making sufficient use of its extra powers, and 
the actual impact on third countries should show whether they are effective.  
In that regard, Ripoli Servent & Mackenzie (2011) argued that as soon as it 
gained its new powers, the EP moderated its positions and became more 
prone to concessions to the security concerns raised by the Commission and 
the Council, and also the United States. Under consultation – with only the 
power to give its opinion – the EP grew to be a clear data protection 
champion. However, this absolute position might be starting to erode. With 
the gain in decision-making powers, the EP has abandoned its policy 
preferences and acquired a taste for consensus and more moderate views 
(Ripoli Servent & Mackenzie, 2011: 401). It appears that more political 
power and responsibility makes it less likely for an entity to take a strong 
position. An NGO, for example, lacks political power and does not have to 
compromise, and can therefore remain fully true to its convictions. A political 
institution with an ability to negotiate and actually influence policy-making, 
on the other hand, will often have to compromise with other political 
institutions. This is true for the EP, but also for the EU as a whole.40 
In the SWIFT negotiations (at least in part a normative dialogue), the only 
EU institution taking a ‘persuading’ stance in the area of privacy and data 
protection is the EP, while the Commission and the Council were seemingly 
quite willing to concede to US demands, or perhaps even agreed with them. 
If a normative power is supposed to shape norms in external entities, the 
position of the Commission and the Council is not exactly fitting. The EP 
definitely appears most deserving of the title ‘normative power’.41 On the 
other hand, if it is true that the EP is moderating its positions now that they 
have more influence, this does not bode well for the prospect of the EU as a 
whole positioning itself as a normative power in this area. And even if the 
                                                          
40 The same is true for opposition parties versus government parties in national parliaments. 
41
 Aided of course by the EU’s privacy watchdogs – the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS. 
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EP, with its increased power at the negotiating table, is able to achieve some 
normative impact on US policies, the incentives for the US to change its 
behavior are unlikely to be based on the universal validity of the EP’s privacy 
arguments. The fact that the US has only changed course when its own 
interests were at stake, shows clear strategic motivations for US action in 
this area. 
Still, the fact that a company like SWIFT can decide to operate solely in the 
EU, putting the EU in a relatively dominant position in the negotiations 
involving the PII of European citizens, thus giving the EU nonviolent means 
to achieve normative impact where the means would otherwise be absent – 
and subsequently achieving such normative impact; this seems illustrative of 
the EU being a normative power. The EU is not using any force, certainly not 
military force, to achieve in the negotiations what it wants to achieve. If it 
wants to achieve normative impact and is in fact able to achieve it, to 
whatever extent, this indicates a kind of power. Though this power is 
probably political rather than normative42, it does point to a willingness on 
the part of the EU to put strategic interests aside for the sake of a human 
right. And although the EU may not be internally consistent, the increased 
powers of the EP have made the EU at the very least more of a normative 
power in the area of privacy and data protection than it was before. 
 
6.2.3  Safe Harbor 
According to the Commission Decision on Safe Harbor (Com, 2010), the 
previously discussed adequacy decisions are to be extended to individual 
processors based in the United Sates. The adequacy decisions generally only 
apply to entire countries but the Commission has made an exception for 
individual data processors in the US, under certain conditions. Safe Harbor 
                                                          
42
 The arguments for the value of privacy were certainly not what persuaded the US to compromise. 
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(SH) is an opt-in program. However, access to the EU single market is 
conditional upon meeting the SH requirements, and due to the importance of 
the single market for many big US data processors, they really have no 
choice but to comply. 
This is a clear example of the EU using economic leverage to induce change 
in an external actor; in this case US data processors desiring access to the 
single market. This economic power ensures a degree of normative impact 
on those US enterprises. The fact that the EU does not benefit economically 
from raising the requirements for access to its market, which actually 
creates additional barriers to trade with the US, seems to indicate an 
elevation of privacy concerns over economic concerns. This could be 
considered characteristic of a normative power.  
However, it could also be looked at the other way around. According to 
Boehm (2014), if data of EU citizens is transferred to the US under SH, it is 
not possible to protect this data from then being subject to US law; and 
since US privacy law applies only to US citizens, EU data is not sufficiently 
protected. Even if the company protects its data to the satisfaction of the 
EU, it cannot guarantee that the US government has no jurisdiction over 
them. So even though it may create incentives for private organizations to 
improve their data protection policies; it may effectively weaken the data 
protection of EU citizens by lowering requirements and not taking into 
account US jurisdiction over companies under SH. It may be then be argued 
the EU has actually prioritized the economic benefit of removing barriers to 
trade over strict adherence to its own privacy and data protection standards; 
a strategic decision. It is a compromise which entails less data protection – 
at least from this perspective – of EU citizens, and may thus be considered 
not to be characteristic of a normative power in this area. 
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6.2.4  N.S.A. 
In hindsight, the normative impact that the EU was able to achieve in the 
negotiations with the US is rather questionable. Edward Snowden leaked 
classified documents in 2013 which revealed that the US did not keep their 
side of the deal (to put it mildly) in the agreement with the EU.43 The 
agreement with the EU entailed that, in the context of counter-terrorism, the 
US could attain (bulk) access to files possibly containing the PII of EU 
citizens, under certain conditions. Such conditions included sufficient regard 
for the privacy of EU citizens and their PII. That was what the whole 
controversy was about in the first place. Now, all of a sudden, it becomes 
known that the US were accessing the PII of EU citizens in even more ways 
than imagined in the agreements. And it was all done in secret; thus making 
the prior EU-US negotiations on this topic appear somewhat meaningless. 
In March 2014, Snowden testified to the EP by video conference, and 
answered some of the many questions that ensued after his revelations44. 
His revelations brought to light that the NSA was even specifically targeting 
the EU in its spying activities45. The EU, and especially the EP, were 
infuriated by what they came to know. Although the debate had always been 
one with heated opinions on two distinctly opposite sides, the negotiations 
                                                          
43 See Haase, Nina (2014, January 9). EU report reveals massive scope of secret NSA surveillance. 
Deutche Welle: <http://www.dw.de/eu-report-reveals-massive-scope-of-secret-nsa-surveillance/a-
17352243> and the Draft Report on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in 
various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic 
cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 2013/2199 (INI): 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jan/ep-draft-nsa-surveillance-report.pdf> 
44
 Snowden testified before the EP by making an introuctory statements after which MEP’s asked a 
variety of pointed questions: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201403/20140307ATT80674/20140307ATT8
0674EN.pdf>  
45 See for example Poitras, Laura et al. (2013, June 29). Attacks from America: NSA Spied on 
European Union Offices. Spiegel Online International: 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nsa-spied-on-european-union-offices-a-908590.html> 
and Poitras, Laura et al. (2013, August 26). Codename ‘Apalachee’: How America Spies on Europe and 
the UN. Spiegel Online International <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-nsa-
documents-show-how-the-us-spies-on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html> and Fidler, Stephen et al. 
(2013, June 30). NSA Accused of Spying on EU. The Wall Street Journal 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323936404578577053539567198> 
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were, and had to be, based on a degree of mutual trust. This trust has been 
befouled by secrecy and disreputable behavior. Moreover, this broken trust 
has had some major consequences. 
The EP called, for example, for the suspension of the SWIFT agreement46, 
while the upcoming negotiations about the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) were called into question47. In an EU-US joint 
statement on March 26 2014, the importance of privacy and data protection 
within TTIP was reaffirmed48. Coming from the US, this statement is rather 
suspect, but they might have been happy to include it for reasons of PR. 
After all, the joint statement was a press release – a media effort. However, 
it seems unlikely for the US to actually make major alterations to its legal 
framework on privacy, which has long been judged inadequate according to 
EU standards. Therefore, negotiations that should involve privacy and data 
protection safeguards are always going to be difficult. An EU that is unwilling 
to compromise in the area of privacy, is an EU that will have a hard time 
coming to agreements with the US, but is also an EU that shows a 
willingness to stand strong on privacy in the face of opposition. A TTIP can 
have substantial economic benefits for the EU (Francois, 2013), but if it is 
                                                          
46 European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the TFTP agreement as a 
result of US National Security Agency surveillance, 2013/2831(RSP): 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0449+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> See also Stearns, Jonathan (2013, October 23). EU Parliament Urges 
Freeze of Terror-Finance Pact With U.S. Bloomberg: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
10-23/eu-parliament-urges-freeze-of-terror-finance-pact-with-u-s-1-> and Traynor, Ian (2013, 
November 26). NSA surveillance: Europe threatens to freeze US data-sharing arrangements. The 
Guardian: < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/nsa-surveillance-europe-threatens-
freeze-us-data-sharing> 
47 Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department’s In-Depth Analysis of Civil society’s 
concerns about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Page 16: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2014/536404/EXPO_IDA(2014)536404_EN.p
df> See also BBC (2013, July 1). Hollande: Bugging allegations threaten EU-US trade pact. BBC News: 
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23125451> and < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bWQ%2bE-
2013-008851%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN> which shows that some EU 
Member States suggest the TTIP negotiations should be suspended. 
48 EU-US Joint Statement of March 26 2014: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-
84_en.htm> to “reaffirm our strong partnership”.  
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willing to jeopardize those benefits for the sake of a fundamental right such 
as privacy, this is certainly characteristic of a normative power.  
Especially the EP has taken a strong and clearly normative position in the 
TTIP negotiations: …to negotiate provisions which touch upon the flow of 
personal data only if the full application of data protection rules on both 
sides of the Atlantic is guaranteed and respected to cooperate with the 
United States in order to encourage third countries to adopt similar high 
data protection standards around the world.49 The EP even recommended 
making the approval of the TTIP conditional on the US dismantling their 
mass surveillance activities.50 It remains to be seen what will actually 
happen, but with the EP having to consent to this international agreement, it 
holds the key to ensuring US concessions on data protection. It holds the 
key to achieving normative impact.  
The NSA scandal also enticed the EP to call for the suspension of Safe 
Harbor51, while conclusions from the Commission about the adequacy of the 
SH agreement include a recognition that the NSA scandal is cause for 
‘serious concern’.52 There is no doubt that the Commission is less outspoken 
about the issue. The recommendations following its conclusions are a mere 
repetition of conditions that were already known to the US before the NSA 
scandal. However, Commissioner Viviane Reding has said that: Safe Harbour 
                                                          
49
 Report containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the European Commission on the 
negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 2014/2228(INI): 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015-
0175+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>  
50
 EU-US negotiations on TTIP: A survey of current issues. In-Depth Analysis by the EPRS: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/559502/EPRS_IDA(2015)559502_EN.pdf>  
51 See LIBE Committee Inquiry: Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens. Protecting fundamental 
rights in a digital age: Proceedings, Outcome and Background Documents: 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/may/ep-LIBE-Inquiry-NSA-Surveillance.pdf> and EP Press 
Release: US NSA: stop mass surveillance now or face consequences. 12-03-2014: < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140307IPR38203/html/US-NSA-stop-
mass-surveillance-now-or-face-consequences-MEPs-say> 
52 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning 
of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, 
COM(2013) 847 final: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf  
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is not safe at all – that is why we have put 13 recommendations to our 
American counterparts – these are non-negotiable. Safe Harbour is a 
European Commission decision to implement, in order to make it easier for 
EU-U.S companies to exchange data. We are discussing these 13 points; so 
far 12 have been answered in a positive way – the 13th point not yet. And 
for me it is very clear: I have made it clear to my counterparts that the 13th 
point must be clarified for the European Commission to finally say that Safe 
Harbour is "safe".53 
This was reiterated by Commissioner Véra Jourová, who claimed that she 
had made it very clear that the EU was going to be strict about how the 
rules of Safe Harbour were applied by the US. On the 13th point that Reding 
had already spoken of was, however, still no agreement. This 13th point 
unsurprisingly had to do with National Security derogations. Nevertheless, 
Jourová intended to finalize talks in May 2015.54 On June 3, Jourová said the 
following in a speech: On Safe Harbour, with the Department of Commerce, 
we have achieved solid commitments on the commercial aspects. However, 
work still needs to continue as far as national security exemptions are 
concerned. Discussions will continue, with the aim of achieving a robust 
revision of the Safe Harbour framework in the near future.55 In other words, 
the negotiations are still stuck at point 13.  
So even though the initial statement by Viviane Reding was powerful – the 
recommendation being non-negotiable – the fact that talks with the US have 
been going on for a while, without apparent progress, seems indicative of a 
lack of persuasive means; a lack of power perhaps. However, the 
                                                          
53 Justice Council press conference by Viviane Reding, 06-06-2014: < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-14-431_nl.htm>  
54
 Vincenti, Daniela (2015, March 13). Věra Jourová: We will be strict with the US on Safe Harbour. Euractiv: 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/infosociety/vera-jourova-we-will-be-strict-us-safe-harbour-
312856>  
55 Press speaking points of Commissioner Jourová at the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial 
Meeting in Riga, 03-06-2015. European Commission Press Release Database: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5112_en.htm> 
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negotiations are also stuck because the EU itself does not want to 
compromise on data protection any longer. The negotiations have two 
parties, and both are resistant to compromise; hence no progress is made. 
The EU’s position in the negotiations is based on its intention to protect 
privacy and personal data; and that can be considered characteristic of a 
normative power in this area. Dependent on the EU’s power in relation to the 
US, it remains to be seen how much normative impact can be achieved 
through these negotiations. 
The NSA scandal has shown that the US initially may not have taken the 
EU’s calls for more privacy safeguards in their bilateral agreements very 
seriously. The US were never actually persuaded. They just pretended to be 
by signing the agreement and then secretly not doing what they said they 
would. However, now that the truth is out, and with public opinion mostly 
siding with the privacy proponents, the US is to an extent forced to submit 
to public demands, which happen to largely align with EU demands, at least 
in principle. The continuous fight for more stringent privacy safeguards on 
the part of the US, also in its foreign relations, may then finally have some 
results. The current zeitgeist, more than in the past, lends itself for 
increased normative impact to be achieved in the area of privacy and data 
protection.56 
 
6.3  Court rulings 
Another important independent actor within the EU is the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has shown in recent years to be willing to make 
consequential decisions in the area of privacy and data protection. Since the 
                                                          
56
 In fact, some changes are already being made in the US with, for example, the USA Freedom Act 
being approved by the US Senate and signed by Barack Obama. See Zengerle, Patricia (2015, June 2). 
Obama’s signature on the Freedom Act reverses security policy that’s been in place since 9/11. Business Insider: 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-signature-on-the-freedom-act-reverses-security-policy-thats-been-in-
place-since-911-2015-6> 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding with the ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the number of ECJ rulings which referred to it saw a 
significant increase (Búrca, 2013). When the Lisbon Treaty took effect, the 
ECJ was suddenly tasked to rule on issues it had little experience with, 
unlike, for example, the European Court of Human Rights. However, as 
Búrca (2013) has shown, the ECJ has been interpreting Charter provisions 
largely in isolation. It has not made much use of external ‘input’ by human 
rights organizations and prior human rights jurisprudence. Búrca fears that 
this could make present and future ECJ case law that involve such issues 
‘insufficiently informed’. Búrca argues that the ECJ should be more open to 
the jurisprudence of other human rights bodies and courts, and to hearing 
argument from those with relevant expertise on the human rights issues 
arising before it (2013: 179). 
Nonetheless, the insufficiently informed ECJ has ruled largely in favor of 
privacy and data protection. While particular cases involving considerations 
of privacy perhaps did not sufficiently take into account other fundamental 
rights or used seemingly simple and one-sided reasoning where 
comprehensive discussion would be justified; their outcomes gave the 
impression of ECJ judges elevating privacy concerns over other concerns. 
This paper will make no judgment on the desirability of the ECJ ruling in this 
manner generally, but will rather take these court decisions as given, and 
analyze them in light of their impact and possible contributory role in making 
the EU a normative power in the area of privacy and data protection. 
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6.3.1  Data Retention Directive 
 
Directive 2006/24/EC, or the Data Retention Directive (DRD), was adopted 
on March 15, 2006.57 It was one more example of privacy-infringing 
legislation being adopted in the context of a heightened alert of imminent 
terrorist attacks.58 It gave Member States guidelines on how long to retain 
stored data of various kinds.59 The purpose of the directive was to give 
authorities responsible for criminal investigations the necessary means to 
effectively fight crime. Data being retained for a certain amount of time 
would give such authorities the option of accessing this data on request, 
whenever deemed necessary for resolving a particular criminal case. The 
Commission has provided evidence for the necessity of data retention 
legislation with reference to empirical data and specific cases in which the 
absence of the retained data used in those cases would supposedly have 
made it impossible to solve them.60 The DRD was considered an essential 
element of European cooperation in combatting borderless crime. 
A Commission evaluation, released on April 18 2011, concluded in favor of 
the DRD and its stated aims.61 It did, however, also give brief consideration 
of its detrimental effects on privacy and data protection of EU citizens, 
protected under article 7 and 8 of the Charter. Data retention constitutes an 
interference with these two fundamental rights, and is therefore required 
under article 52(1) of the Charter to be necessary and proportional. It may 
be argued, in line with the Commission’s reasoning and supporting evidence, 
                                                          
57
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF>  
58 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Evaluation report on the 
Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC): <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0225:FIN:en:PDF>  
59 A minimum of six months and a maximum of twenty-four months. 
60 European Commission – Evidence for necessity of data retention in the EU: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/policies/police_cooperation/evidence_en.pdf>  
61 See note 53 
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that data retention is necessary for public safety and crime prevention; 
maybe even for national security. The question then remains whether it is 
also proportionate. 
The DRD had already received strong criticism from by means of, for 
example, a letter collectively signed by stakeholders to Commissioner 
Malmström.62 More letters were sent to Malmström after this and increased 
in their elaboration.63 They found the Directive to be incompatible with the 
Charter, unnecessary in achieving its objective and not proportional to what 
it aimed to achieve; and they provided plausible evidence to support their 
case. Their arguments underlined the harm done by mass surveillance and 
blanket data retention, and the importance of minimizing any potential 
infringement on the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.  
As such, there were two sides in the debate about the DRD: the proponents, 
such as the Commission, on the one side; and the opponents, which mostly 
included civil and human rights organizations, on the other. The EP, shown 
to be a privacy proponent in other areas, was claimed by some to have ‘sold 
out’ with regard to the DRD (Peers, 2005). According to Ripoli Servent & 
Mackenzie (2011:393) the DRD is the most evident example of the EP 
moderating its position after gaining more power; something they 
supposedly also did with regard to the SWIFT agreement. However, when 
the civil and human rights organizations started vocalizing their discontent, 
the EP also began to demand reforms and improvements to the DRD.64  
                                                          
62 Letter to Cecilia Malmström: 
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/dr_final.pdf>  
63 See for example the letter signed on September 3 2010: 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/dec/eu-mandatory-data-retention-civil-society-letter-
10.pdf> and the one sent on September 26 2011: 
<http://www.aedh.eu/plugins/fckeditor/userfiles/file/Actualit%C3%A9s%20des%20ligues%20membr
es/EDRI%20letter%20to%20Commissioner%20Malmstr%C3%B6m%2026_09_2011.pdf>  
64 European Parliament News. MEPs cast doubt on controversial rules for keeping data on phone and 
internet use. Newsroom: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20121019STO53997/html/MEPs-cast-doubt-on-controversial-rules-to-keep-data-on-
phone-and-internet-use> 
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All the while in 2012, the ECJ received requests for preliminary rulings on 
cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 concerning the validity of the DRD, which 
became all the more relevant in light of the NSA scandal a year later. On 
April 8 2014, the ECJ ruled the DRD to be invalid.65 The DRD entails a wide-
ranging and particularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to 
respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, without that 
interference being limited to what is strictly necessary.66 The ECJ 
acknowledged that the retention of data under DRD may be appropriate in 
light of its objective, but that the Directive in its current form did not 
constitute an appropriate means to its ends, due to it being an excessive 
infringement on privacy and data protection.67  
The ECJ coming to the conclusion it did is an example of the ECJ elevating 
privacy concerns over potential other concerns. Whether or not one agrees 
with the ECJ’s verdict, it cannot be denied that the ECJ acknowledges the 
value of privacy and data protection and of the Charter articles protecting 
these values. It effectively accomplished what various NGO’s already wanted 
to achieve.68 There is still uncertainty about what the decision will mean for 
data retention legislation in individual member states.69 On the whole, 
however, the ECJ holds substantial power within the EU. Its decisions are 
binding. Therefore, an ECJ ruling in favor of privacy and data protection is an 
                                                          
65 Court of Justice of the European Union. Press Release No 54/14 on the Judgment in Joined Cases C-
293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others. April 8 2014: 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf>  
66 Idem   
67 Although the ECJ nowhere specifically referred to the communications of the civil and human rights 
organizations, its reasoning is remarkably similar. So while it is difficult to tell whether the arguments 
made by the NGO’s directly influenced the eventual verdict, it is also unlikely that the ECJ judges were 
totally unaware of them. Therefore, where Búrca (2013) fears an insufficiently informed ECJ, in this 
case it could be argued that it was sufficiently informed for them to come to the same conclusions. 
68 The ECJ can thus be said to act in a normatively coherent manner. 
69 This question was already vocalized by Sophie in ‘t Veld in a letter to Commissioner Malmström 
after the ECJ ruling: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/carol/index.cfm?fuseaction=download&documentId=090166e59724b7c6&title=
29.04.2014_Letter to Commissioner Malmström on judgment data retention directive - signed.pdf>  
Her question gains legitimacy in light of recent events in Belgium < https://edri.org/belgian-
constitutional-court-rules-against-dataretention/>, Germany <https://edri.org/data-retention-
german-government-tries-again/>, and the Netherlands 
<http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/03/11/dutch-court-strikes-down-countrys-data-retention-law/> 
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
59 
 
ECJ that makes the EU more of normative power than would otherwise be 
the case.  
 
6.3.2  The Right to be Forgotten 
 
Since the beginning of time, for us humans, forgetting has been the norm 
and remembering the exception. Because of digital technology and global 
networks, however, this balance has shifted. Today, with the help of 
widespread technology, forgetting has become the exception, and 
remembering the default.70  
Our tendency to retain rather than discard information has increased 
corollary to the decrease in the cost of retention (Mayer-Schönberger, 
2007). Our enhanced ability to analyze data for various purposes makes 
data more valuable, and the retention of said data fruitful and worthwhile. 
The internet has proven an immense and ever-expanding repository of 
stored data, which tends to remain stored for unspecified periods of time. At 
the same time, access to such data has been made relatively easy by the 
advent of search engines such as Google. The data stored on the internet, 
retrievable through search engines, also includes personal data. Hence, 
access to personal data has been made easier as well. And this has had 
some significant implications. 
In 2010, Consteja González filed a complaint against a Spanish newspaper 
and Google Spain. In this he was supported by the Spanish national data 
protection agency (AEPD). González complained about the fact that when 
one would search for his name on Google, the search results would include 
references to his past which reflected negatively on him. They referenced his 
former home being repossessed and put up for auction. At the time, he was 
                                                          
70 Mayer-Schönberger (2011: 2). 
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in debt and was unable to fulfil his financial obligations. These issues were 
eventually resolved, but references to them still appeared on Google. 
González and the AEPD found this to infringe on his right to privacy.  
González’ case was not the only one of its kind. Of course, not all of them 
ended up in a court room, but there are plenty of situations imaginable 
wherein people are negatively affected by publically accessible information 
related to them that lingers on the internet.71 Dark chapters of one’s past 
are a mouse-click away from resurfacing. The internet remembers what is 
perhaps better forgotten. To provide mitigation for such problems, a so-
called ‘right to be forgotten’ was proposed and widely debated. According to 
Xanthoulis (2013: 98), this right is a ‘specific expression of a 
multidimensional right to privacy’. It entails an opportunity for individuals to 
have information relating to them, which is inaccurate or no longer relevant, 
deleted from its source. This ought to give people more control over their 
personal data on the internet.  
While the debate around the right to be forgotten mostly revolved around 
the value of the right to privacy as compared to other rights and freedoms72, 
and about its potential detrimental effects on those other rights and 
freedoms; most would agree that a right to be forgotten does enhance one’s 
privacy and protects one’s personal data. Wanting to create such a right can 
therefore justly be considered part of normative intent, albeit only in the 
area of privacy and data protection. 
                                                          
71
 There is the often cited example of Stacy Snyder, an aspiring teacher who, despite having excellent 
qualifications, was denied certification. A Myspace picture of her dressed as a pirate and holding a 
plastic cup, titled ‘drunken pirate’, supposedly disqualified her as a role model for kids (Mayer-
Schönberger, 2011:1). While the initial posting could be deleted, copies of the picture could not, and 
were still a mere search command away from being found. Another striking example was given in a 
comment on a Guardian article by user Owakahnige.71 His 10 year old son’s mother was murdered 
when he was a baby. News reports of this past tragedy are still traceable to his name when searching 
for it on Google. 
72 Rosen, Jeffrey (2012, February 13). The Right to be Forgotten. Stanford Law Review: 
<http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten?em_x=22>  
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
61 
 
In a 2010 press release, Commissioner Viviane Reding first mentioned the 
idea of a right to be forgotten in the context of protecting data in the online 
single market and fully supported it.73 A conditional right to ‘erasure’ was 
already implied in article 12 of Directive 95/46 but it was more literally 
codified in the Commission’s draft proposal for a GDPR under article 17. The 
Commission being the initiator of reform, at least on the political level, and 
Commissioner Reding being so outspoken about the inclusion of a right to be 
forgotten; it seems that the Commission for once led the EU in acting on its 
supposed normative intentions.  
In 2014, the aforementioned Consteja González case ended up developing 
into the ECJ court case that came to be associated with the right to be 
forgotten. Initially, the matter was to be resolved in the Spanish court, but 
this court referred the following questions to the ECJ for preliminary ruling: 
1 Does the 1995 data protection directive apply to search engines like 
Google?  
2 Does EU law apply to Google Spain, since its servers are in the US? 
3 Do individuals have the right to request information be removed 
under the right to be forgotten? 
On May 13 2014, the ECJ essentially answered 'yes' to all three of these 
questions, thus ‘establishing’ the right to be forgotten.74 However, despite 
the fact that Case C131/12 came to be known as the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
case, the ECJ did not actually invent anything new. It only interpreted an 
                                                          
73 Speech/10/327 by Viviane Reding on Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market. 22-06-2010: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-327_en.htm> 73 In a speech that same year, she 
said the following: Personal data can easily be stored and then even more easily multiplied on the 
Web. But it is not easy to wipe it out. As somebody once said: “God forgives and forgets but the Web 
never does!” This is why “the right to be forgotten” is so important for me. With more and more 
private data floating around the Web – especially on social networking sites – people should have the 
right to have their data completely removed.” Speech/10/700 by Viviane Reding on Privacy Matters – 
Why the EU needs new personal data protection rules. 30-11-2010: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-10-700_en.htm> 
74
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) in Case C-131/12. Request for a preliminary ruling under 
Article 267 TFEU from the Audencia Nacional (Spain): 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0131&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=>  
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already existing right to erasure codified in Directive 95/46 (Bunn, 2015). 
The case was, on the other hand, undoubtedly consequential and its effects 
immediately visible. After all, the case specifically applied to Google, one of 
the largest and most influential companies in the world, and ruled to be a 
data processor according to the ECJ’s interpretation of article 2(b) and 2(d) 
of Directive 95/46. The new right to be forgotten implied a new ‘obligation to 
forget’ for Google.75 Google has already processed over a quarter million 
requests for the deletion of over a million URLs; a little over 40% have so far 
been granted.76 The proven impact of the ruling exemplifies the power of the 
EU judiciary branch. 
The ruling in Case C-131/12 is another example of the ECJ ruling in favor of 
privacy. In fact, it seems even to clearly elevate one fundamental right over 
the other; article 7 and 8 of the Charter over article 11. Article 11 concerns 
the freedom of expression and information – not an unimportant freedom – 
and the ECJ did not even mention this article in its verdict. While this could 
be considered an example of the ECJ not being sufficiently informed or being 
improperly minimalistic and simplistic in its reasoning, which would make 
Búrca’s (2013) fear at least partially justified; it does indicate a presence of 
normative intent in the area of privacy and data protection underlining the 
ECJ’s judicial power. And normative intent underlined by power makes 
normative impact much more likely. 
The ECJ’s interpretation of article 4(1)a of Directive 95/46 also effectively 
widened the Directive´s scope of application. The ECJ decision ensured that 
enterprises operating in the single market are bound to EU law even when 
their servers are not located in Europe. It thus increased the potential for 
normative impact because data processors that are established in a third 
                                                          
75 ‘To be forgotten’ is an action performed on the subject by someone else; therefore a ‘right’ to be 
forgotten implies an obligation for another to forget you. 
76 Google Transparency Report. European privacy requests for search removals (data last updated: 
July 16 2015): <http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en>  
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country, yet conduct commercial activities in the single market, like Google, 
are now bound by EU privacy standards for processing personal data.77 The 
ECJ has thus used its judicial power largely in support of privacy and data 
protection. Whether or not this is proof of normative intent on the part of the 
ECJ, its power certainly raises the potential for normative impact and 
contributes to making the EU more of normative power in the area of privacy 
and data protection.  
  
                                                          
77 This decision stands in remarkable contrast with the events surrounding the total relocation of 
SWIFT’s servers to the EU. By moving all of its servers to the EU, SWIFT positioned itself beyond the 
reach of US jurisdiction (at least in theory). The ECJ has now ruled that server location is no barrier 
for EU law to apply.  
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7  Normative Impact 
 
Increased cross-border activity spawns jurisdictional overlaps. (Shaffer, 
2000: 3) 
Before Directive 95/46 took effect, data transfer bans from one EU Member 
State to another were a regular occurrence. Transfers from states with 
higher relative protection, such as Germany and France, to states with lower 
relative protection, such as Italy, would on occasion be blocked because data 
protection laws in the latter states were deemed to provide inadequate 
protection of PII (Shaffer, 2000). Because data transfers are an increasingly 
important condition of efficient cross-border trade, data transfer bans 
constitute a barrier to such trade. The Directive was aimed at harmonization 
of data protection laws; and this harmonization, aside from guaranteeing a 
high level of protection, was aimed at lowering barriers to trade within the 
EU caused by the divergence in data protection laws.  
While contributing to the liberalization of EU internal trade on the one hand, 
Directive 95/46 also created barriers to trade with third countries. Adequacy 
requirements entail data transfer bans to third countries with lower relative 
protection. A comparison with the pre-Directive situation in the EU is then 
easily made. Its solution would then supposedly be to also harmonize data 
protection laws on a global scale. However, this is easier said than done. The 
EU has no jurisdiction over third countries. As such, it requires other means 
to induce change and de facto harmonization. It requires other means to 
achieve normative impact. 
 
 
 
PRIVACY POWER EUROPE  Reinder Flaton - 0942251 
65 
 
7.1  Impact on individual enterprises 
 
“There is only one program of privacy protection at Microsoft,” and it’s 
Europe’s, says Richard Purcell, Microsoft’s director of corporate privacy.78 
Third countries are not bound by EU law. Therefore, they need other 
incentives to change. While the EU may actively promote the adoption of 
data protection standards of a higher level, EU external actors are often 
more persuaded by economic incentives than they are by moralistic 
pandering. This is confirmed by the so-called ‘Brussels Effect’. The Brussels 
Effect describes the phenomenon of EU regulations affecting citizens around 
the world, and not merely those residing within the EU itself (Bradford, 
2011; 2012; 2014). It constitutes an extension of the ‘California Effect’, 
which describes the phenomenon of larger jurisdictions setting regulatory 
standards for smaller ones due to the importance of their markets (Vogel, 
1995; Bradford, 2012; 2014). California, the largest market in the US, also 
happens to apply relatively strict regulations, especially in the environmental 
sector (Vogel, 1995). Large markets are an attractive target for exporters, 
but to export to California, businesses have to meet the relatively high 
applicable standards. In this way, California is able to export its own 
standards to individual enterprises, but also to other US states.  
The same could be observed in Europe. Germany and France, due to the 
importance and relative size of their markets compared to other EU Member 
States, had the economic ‘leverage’ to raise collective EU data protection 
standards to their own higher level. A smaller Member State would not have 
had the same bargaining power. It was the convergence of interests of 
                                                          
78 Mitchener, Brandon (2002, April 23). Rules, Regulations of Global Economy Are Increasingly Being 
Set in Brussels. The Wall Street Journal: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1019521240262845360> 
see also Bowcott, Owen (2015, March 24). Facebook data privacy case to be heard before European 
Union Court. The Guardian: <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/24/facebook-data-
privacy-european-union-court-maximillian-schrems> and Schechner, Sam (2014, September 25). EU 
Privacy Watchdogs Warn Google About Its Policy. The Wall Street Journal: 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-privacy-watchdogs-warn-google-about-its-policy-1411666047> 
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powerful states, backed by large markets, to both facilitate free information 
flows and retain stringent data privacy controls which permitted the 
Directive to go forward. It was France and Germany’s political exploitation of 
market power than enabled protection to be traded up throughout the EU. 
(Shaffer, 2010: 13) 
In line with these observations, the EU, as the largest market in the world, 
should have this same potential. And this is where the Brussels Effect comes 
in. The EU has been able to export its standards globally through ‘unilateral 
regulatory globalization’ (Bradford, 2011; 2012; 2014). Unilateral regulatory 
globalization is a development where a law of one jurisdiction migrates into 
another in the absence of the former actively imposing it or the latter 
willingly adopting it. (Bradford, 2014: 2) Bradford explains how the 
opportunity costs of resisting adaptation to the EU’s high standards are too 
high. The EU’s market power creates ‘involuntary incentives’ for adaptation. 
As such, the influence of EU regulation is not the intended result of active 
persuasion or promotion of EU norms, but rather the unintended 
consequence of EU acts and aspirations, underlined by its substantial market 
power (idem).  
The EU’s market power combined with its relatively strict market regulations 
sheds an alternative light on globalization. For many, globalization connotes 
downward pressures on domestic regulatory standards and social 
protections. Commercial enterprises would target markets with low relative 
standards, incentivizing states to lower their standards in order to attract 
such enterprises. This expectation, however, is at least partially negated by 
the California Effect in that enterprises operating on a global scale have 
found the benefit of adopting one uniform global high standard to weigh up 
significantly to adopting multiple lower standards (Bradford, 2011; 2012; 
2014; Shaffer, 2000). Internet companies find it difficult to create different 
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programs for different markets and therefore tend to apply the strictest 
international standards across the board. (Bradford, 2012: 25) 
The EU’s market is too important for most globally operating enterprises to 
risk forfeiting access by not adapting to EU standards. Such enterprises will 
therefore recognize the necessity of adaptation. Because uniform global 
standardization is economically preferable to applying different standards in 
different markets, the only prudent option is for enterprises to adopt the 
highest standard among the most important targeted markets. The EU’s 
tendency to maintain high relative standards in addition to it being the 
largest market in the world, should thus effectively imply that enterprises 
are most likely to adopt EU standards rather than those of other 
jurisdictions. After all, high commercial standards are acceptable in low 
standard markets, but not vice versa. Adopting the high relative standards 
of the EU should thus grant access to all targeted markets. 
The Brussels Effect entails a major potential for the externalization of EU 
norms, including privacy and data protection norms. The importance of the 
single market gives the EU leverage for triggering desired change in external 
entities. The external entities affected by the Brussels Effect are individual 
enterprises first and foremost. Independent of third country governments, 
foreign enterprises are incentivized to change policy for economic reasons. 
Initial single market access being one of them, the motivations for 
complying with privacy and data protection regulations extend also to 
deterrents to noncompliance.79 That is why the EU in its proposed GDPR 
intends to include significant fines for enterprises failing to comply with data 
protection rules.80  
                                                          
79 The Ponemon Institute (2011) conducted a study which showed that while the cost of compliance is 
great, the cost of noncompliance is far greater. Of course, for any regulation to make any sense at all, 
the cost of noncompliance should be higher than that of compliance. 
80 European Commission Press Release. Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data 
protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to cut costs for businesses. 25-01-2012: 
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The EU has the power to anticipate on the economic incentives of 
commercial enterprises. Foreign enterprises, who are not bound by EU law 
yet are unwilling to forfeit single market access or risk fines, are likely to 
adapt to the EU’s high relative regulatory standards. This gives the EU 
additional and, more importantly, effective means to create de facto 
jurisdictional overlaps. It gives the EU the power to shape global regulatory 
standards, including those of privacy and data protection, thus enabling the 
EU to achieve substantial normative impact abroad. Such impact is 
illustrated by the fact that numerous US enterprises have adapted policy, 
though perhaps reluctantly, to meet Safe Harbor requirements.81 Big US 
corporations are by necessity adopting EU privacy standards. Even where US 
enterprises have tried to circumvent EU data protection standards by 
maintaining its data processing activities elsewhere, such as Google in the 
Right to be Forgotten case, the ECJ has ruled EU law still applicable. The ECJ 
has thereby increased the strength and scope of the Brussels Effect.  
The single market therefore is and remains the EU’s seemingly most 
effective source of power (Damro, 2012). It gives the EU options and 
opportunities that it would otherwise not have. However, this market power 
is no sufficient condition for regulatory externalization. It also requires 
political means such as ‘regulatory capacity and propensity’ (Bradford, 
2014). The EU’s regulatory capacity and propensity in the area of privacy 
and data protection is confirmed by the upcoming GDPR. As a regulation 
rather than a directive, the regulatory capacity of the EU should increase; 
and because the regulation is meant to enhance protection in this digital era, 
the EU’s regulatory propensity is ensured as well. With an ECJ’s ruling 
having even enhanced the EU’s regulatory scope, this observation gives 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm> Independent national data protection 
authorities will be strengthened so they can better enforce the EU rules at home. They will be 
empowered to fine companier that violate EU data protection rules. This can lead to penalties of up to 
€1 million or up to 2% of global annual turnover of a company. 
81 US-EU Safe Harbor List: <https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx>  
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credence to the notion that a normative power requires other ‘forms’ of 
power to be effective. Economic and political means are much more likely to 
achieve normative ends than any supposed ‘normative means’ would.  
 
7.2  Impact on third country legislation 
 
Although the US has waged a vocal campaign against Europe’s approach, it 
has failed to contain the spread of European rules. Seven countries – 
including leading economies such as Japan, Canada, and Australia – that 
previously shared the US approach have switched to Europe’s 
comprehensive system. (Bach and Newman, 2007: 833) 
Third country governments are constrained in their ability to retaliate 
against the EU and its strict data protection regulations, because WTO rules 
do not allow it. WTO rules thus constitute a ‘shield’ against foreign 
governments who disapprove (Shaffer, 2000). But this is consequential only 
if those foreign governments are actually desiring retaliation. The evidence, 
rather, shows that they are not. More and more other countries are willingly 
adopting their own data privacy laws, and are measurably influenced by EU 
regulatory standards (Greenleaf, 2012; 2015). In the area of data 
protection, European regulations have become the aspired international 
standard (Shaffer, 2000). 
The particular influence of EU regulations is measured by those provisions 
and requirements that are found in Directive 95/46 but not in for example 
the OECD Guidelines or the APEC framework (Greenleaf, 2012). There are, 
of course, elements common to all data protection laws, and those could 
therefore be seen as most influential. However, there are also those 
elements which were initially unique to the EU approach, which are not 
present in other transnational frameworks, and are not always present in 
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national data protection laws outside the EU. Such elements being adopted 
by third country legislatures may be considered evidence of EU standards 
influencing decision-making abroad.82  
Graham Greenleaf (2012) identified 10 elements which are supposedly 
‘European’ in that none of those elements are recommended or mandated by 
the OECD or APEC, such as the presence of an independent Data Protection 
Authority, judicial protection against violations of data privacy rights, 
obligations for data processors to use data only to the extent necessary for 
some declared purpose, etc. Greenleaf’s findings confirm the influence of EU 
data privacy laws in the 33 countries that were included in the study. 
Nineteen had seven or more European elements, while thirteen had at least 
nine. His latest research confirmed that 109 countries have so far already 
enacted data privacy laws (Greenleaf, 2015). 
The influence of EU data protection regulations on legislation abroad takes 
differing trajectories, and are often determined by linguistic factors.83 South- 
and Middle-American countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico are 
influenced by Spain’s data protection law (Eustace and Bohn, 2013), while 
Macau’s Personal Data Protection Act84 is known to be based on Portuguese 
law (Greenleaf, 2008; 2012). On the other hand, a country like South-Korea, 
whose amended data protection law became effective on November 29 
201485, has no apparent links with European states or languages yet has 
been seemingly influenced by as much as nine of the European elements 
                                                          
82 Greenleaf (2012) recognizes that it is difficult to know for certain whether laws adopted by third 
country governments are actually influenced by EU regulation. It is challenging to prove direct 
causation. However, reasonable inferences can be made. 
83 See for example <http://www.redipd.org/> ; and Eustace and Bohn (2013) for the influence of 
Spanish data protection laws on adopted legislation in third countries, primarily in South-America, 
through the Spanish language; and <http://www.afapdp.org/> for a data protection association using 
the French language as means for spreading privacy ideas and influencing relevant law. 
84 Macao Act 8/2005. Personal Data Protection Act 
<http://www.gpdp.gov.mo/uploadfile/2013/1217/20131217120421182.pdf> 
85 The Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Data Protection, 
Etc. <http://koreanlii.or.kr/w/images/d/df/DPAct2014_ext.pdf> 
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(Greenleaf, 2012). Therefore, though linguistic factors are influential, they 
are no prerequisite.  
There are various explanations imaginable for the far-reaching influence of 
EU data protection rules. The first is that third country governments simply 
recognize the inherent value in having stricter rules for protecting their 
citizens’ privacy and PII, and consider that copying EU rules would have such 
effect. Another plausible reason is that they have considered the economic 
benefit of adopting EU rules rather than rules applying in jurisdictions with 
lower relative protection. Although tougher regulations often entail a higher 
administrative burden for enterprises as well as government; adoption of EU 
standards would increase the likelihood of them meeting the EU’s adequacy 
requirements, thus effectively enabling additional trade to take place 
between the EU market and theirs. Yet another explanation is that third 
country governments consider the merit of commercial enterprises or other 
governments recognizing the ability to ensure adequate protection and 
means to process trans-border data flows, thus making them a more 
attractive target for trade.86 
There is no definitive answer to the question of ‘why?’  It is difficult to tell 
what the actual incentives are for third country governments to change their 
data protection laws. It could have multiple reasons for that matter. 
Providing clear-cut evidence for the incentives of foreign governments to 
change is beyond the scope of this paper. It is apparent, however, that EU 
regulations in the area of privacy and data protection are having significant 
impact beyond EU borders. The Brussels Effect explains how economic 
considerations incentivize individual foreign enterprises to adapt to EU 
                                                          
86
 Commission (2012c: 39) 
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standards, while the governments who should supposedly exercise 
jurisdiction over these enterprises are visibly following suit.87  
  
                                                          
87 While it is less clear what drives legislative changes abroad, Bradford (2014) considered the 
possibility of enterprises lobbying their respective governments to change policy in order to level the 
playing field domestically, because domestic enterprises who are less export-oriented and thus less 
dependent on and influenced by foreign jurisdictions, would supposedly have a local competitive 
advantage otherwise. 
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8  Conclusions 
 
In conclusion of this paper, the PPE ideal type features are revisited in light 
of the findings in previous chapters.  
PPE should have the intent to defend, promote and spread the privacy norm. 
While EU legislation covering data protection and the implicit right to privacy 
are in its application limited by its territorial scope, the texts do hint at an 
underlying ‘higher goal’. Provision 2 of the DPD as well as the inclusion in 
the Charter of the right to private life and data protection under articles 7 
and 8 respectively, indicate an acknowledgment of these rights being 
applicable to ‘individuals’, and not merely those residing in the EU. One may 
conclude on that basis that although EU action is oftentimes limited by 
practicalities and bounded jurisdiction, its relevant policies are intended to 
affect, in the best scenario, individuals outside the EU as well. Article 21 of 
the TEU codifies this intention. EU action in line with this intent is therefore 
consonant with a cosmopolitan mindset.  
That is, if and only if one presumes or accepts the universal validity of the 
privacy norm, of course. This universal validity is partly assumed but to a 
large extent also confirmed by the evidence. NGO’s consisting of thinkers of 
all kinds of different backgrounds are more than ever acting, writing and 
speaking in defense of the assumed fundamental right to privacy. The 
revelations of Edward Snowden about the NSA’s indiscriminate and intrusive 
surveillance activities caused a monumental backlash against governments 
violating individual privacy, while at the same time lending substantial 
momentum to the ideational spread of the privacy norm. Nations around the 
world are or have been enacting data privacy laws. The EU does not stand 
alone in its normative intentions, and should not refrain from taking the lead 
on this issue, and to be more effective than others ever could. 
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PPE should act in accordance with the privacy norm and should show internal 
consistency in doing so. 
The EU does not consist of a single entity and is not uniform in its positions 
and approaches. The EU consists of various institutions, which in turn consist 
of even more individuals, all having their own views and opinions. General 
observations can, however, be made. The EP has been most vocal and most 
adamant about defending and promoting privacy and effective data 
protection. In comparison, the Commission and the Council have clearly 
taken more moderate views, and have, much more often than the EP, taken 
a less normative position in the negotiations with the US. The Commission 
and Council were more willing to compromise, and this tendency to 
compromise may be related to the underlying power of the entities taking 
part in the negotiations. The EP as well apparently moderated its position 
when its power was enhanced.  
The EU can thus not be said to show internal consistency in its positions and 
actions when it comes to privacy and data protection. Even though it is 
difficult for anyone to deny the importance of privacy, the EU seems very 
much divided on its comparative value, and does not always prioritize 
defending its privacy standards to strategic considerations. The NSA 
revelations, however, have seemingly brought back the fervor in the EU’s 
defense of the privacy norm. The far-reaching violations of our privacy have 
confirmed the desirability of protecting it. The recognition of the importance 
of privacy has taken back its place in the minds of our representatives. 
PPE should elevate concerns about privacy and data protection over strategic 
concerns. 
More often than not, different institutions within the EU have elevated 
concerns about privacy and data protection over particular other concerns. 
The Commission’s adequacy decisions are meant to lift barriers to trade with 
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third countries. However, these barriers were raised by the EU’s DPD in the 
first place. This entailed a forgoing of potential trade with the aim of 
ensuring adequate protection, and thus an elevation of the EU’s data 
protection standards over the economic benefits of trading with particular 
third countries.  
The Safe Harbor agreement, on the other hand, can be interpreted in 
different ways. It inhibits trade by raising requirements for enterprises being 
granted market access, while enhancing the adequacy of the privacy policies 
of those enterprises, but it also entails a compromise with the US 
government on existing EU standards, while being unable to ensure 
protection of the PII of EU citizens because the US has jurisdiction over 
these enterprises. The NSA revelations have made it patently obvious that 
the law did not really matter at all. The NSA had access to our data anyway. 
As such, Safe Harbor is currently being renegotiated, and the EU is now less 
willing to compromise. While this situation has seemingly resulted in an 
impasse in the negotiations, this uncompromising stance re-illustrates the 
normative intent of the EU.  
The ECJ, too, has on at least two occasions elevated concerns about privacy 
and data protection over other concerns. The DRD was found to infringe on 
our right to private life and data protection, despite functioning as a 
supposed means to effectively fight and solve transnational crimes. Its 
objective was judged legitimate, but was considered not an appropriate 
means to achieve this objective. The law was not proportionate. In the right 
to be forgotten case, the ECJ has elevated articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
over article 11. Although article 11 cannot be considered a strategic interest, 
the ECJ’s ruling did enhance the scope of application of EU privacy standards 
and confirms the ECJ’s contribution to the EU being a normative power in the 
area of privacy and data protection. 
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PPE should be effective in achieving the spread of privacy and data 
protection norms. 
It is absolutely essential for a privacy power to be effective in achieving its 
relevant aims. Being ineffectual, after all, implies a lack of power. Perhaps 
this is stating the obvious; but one cannot be a Privacy Power without 
power. If power is understood as an ability to make others do what one 
wants, and thus to induce change in particular chosen areas, then it is 
uncertain whether normative forms of power are truly relevant forms of 
power. If military power, for example, entails the ability to use military 
means to cause effects, then normative power should entail the ability to use 
normative means to cause effects. What those ‘means’ are is quite 
important.  
It is unclear what ‘normative means’ really are. If they merely include the 
power of persuasion on the basis of valid argumentation or behaving in an 
ethical way, then the EU would be no different from an NGO. NGO’s have 
these same means at their disposal. As a concept, therefore, a normative 
power should have a defining differential element to it. For the EU, its 
market is what sets it apart from other international actors. The single 
market is and remains the EU’s most effective source of power. Foreign 
entities may be dependent on being granted market access to some extent, 
and this can be used as a means; as leverage (a form of power). This 
economic power enables the EU to translate its normative intent into actual 
normative impact.  
In the area of privacy and data protection, the impact is strong. 
governments around the world are influenced by EU standards when 
adopting their own data privacy laws. 109 nations have already enacted 
such laws. Furthermore, the Brussels Effect allows the EU to externalize its 
standards to foreign enterprises and third country governments. The 
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importance of the single market in combination with the EU having relatively 
high regulatory data protection standards, creates ‘involuntary incentives’ 
for commercial enterprises to adopt EU standards across the board rather 
than adhering to various lower standards elsewhere. Adopting the highest 
uniform standard across the board is the only prudent option.  
Economic incentives of external actors lead to normative opportunities for 
the EU. To know what others need and how much they need it, is to know 
what one can ask for in return. The EU is able to use the importance of its 
market as a means to make others do things that are in line with the EU’s 
normative ends. Other means play their roles and should be factored in, but 
it is the single market which makes the important difference. It is market 
access that others want, and it is market access that the EU can either 
provide or prohibit. In the context of international relations, this is the main 
power that the EU possesses. Economic rather than normative power, 
perhaps, but it is clearly possible to use this economic power to achieve 
significant normative impact. As such, its proven impact abroad significantly 
contributes to making the EU a Privacy Power. 
Final Words 
To revisit the NPE hypothesis, I lay claim to a new but concise definition of a 
normative power: a civilian power with normative intent and the means to 
achieve significant normative impact, on condition of the norm being 
universally valid. A privacy power then constitutes a subset of this definition. 
Because the EU shows a large degree of normative intent, and through its 
economic power is able to achieve substantial normative impact, the internal 
inconsistencies and occasional contradictions in the area of privacy and data 
protection are not sufficient to delegitimize the hypothesized concept of 
Privacy Power Europe.  
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